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INTRODUCTION
Lars Erslev Andersen, Yang Jiang and 
Camilla Sørensen
This collection of short papers is an outcome 
of an international conference entitled China 
and the Challenges in Greater Middle East, 
organized by the Danish Institute for Interna-
tional Studies and Copenhagen University on 
10 November 2015. The conference sought 
answers to the following questions: Is the 
balance of power between the US and China 
changing in the Persian Gulf? Will China’s 
increasing economic interests in the Gulf 
lead to a more activist Chinese foreign and 
security policy there? What are the expecta-
tions the Arab Gulf States have of China, and 
will China meet them?
The background to the conference was Chi-
na’s increasing interest in the Persian Gulf si-
multaneously with what has been interpreted 
as America’s gradual retreat from the region. 
Even though the US has been providing the 
security umbrella in the region, its handling 
of ethnic conflicts and civil wars has irritated 
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC). Political developments, including 
9/11 and the Arab Spring, have forced the 
GCC member states to take action to avoid 
the spread of democratic movements and 
revolutions while seeking to handle their own 
affairs without interference from the US, 
the EU and the UN. Problems in GCC–US 
relations have also made GCC states look 
eastwards for new partners, providing a 
power vacuum and opportunity for China to 
insert itself.
 
The Middle East is in a process of radical re-
structuring following the Arab Spring of 2011, 
the escalation of sectarian conflict in Iraq 
and the outbreak and development of the 
civil war in Syria. These circumstances have 
given rise to enhanced security concerns. In 
order to understand the post-9/11 regional 
security dynamics, we need to challenge the 
oft-repeated perception of American hege-
mony and analyze the rising importance of 
Asia in the region, especially the role of Chi-
na. Whereas US Middle East policy has been 
subjected to endless academic analyses, this 
new axis between the Persian Gulf and China 
has not received much attention. 
China has been expanding its economic in-
volvement in the Persian Gulf, not least in oil: 
the majority of its oil comes from the region. 
Although China is trying to diversify its ener-
gy supplies away from the Middle East, it will 
remain dependent on the Arab States and 
Iran for years to come. With expanding trade, 
investment and contract work in the Persian 
Gulf, China is seeking to protect its assets 
and citizens there. As argued, and as shown 
in the papers by Camilla T.N. Sørensen and 
Miwa Hirono, China can no longer follow 
the old diplomatic strategy of keeping a low 
profile and keeping business and politics 
separate. China especially has learned from 
the crises in Libya and Sudan and is gradu-
ally changing its policy from one of non-in-
tervention to what is often termed ‘active 
mediation’, ‘limited intervention’ or ‘creative 
involvement’.
 
Doubts remain, both within the GCC and 
in Chinese policy-making circles, as to the 
extent to which China should be strategical-
ly involved in the Middle East. China is not 
seeking to challenge or replace the US as 
the security provider in the region. However, 
there is no doubt that ‘active pragmatism’ 
has become China’s guiding diplomatic strat-
egy and that we will see more political and 
strategic activity from China in the region 
while it continues to pursue its economic 
interests. China will also play a more active 
role in fighting extremism at home, as well as 
in the Greater Middle East, including Afghan-
istan and Iraq. How will this combination of 
strategies be played out?
In order to address these themes and dis-
cuss the questions mentioned above , we 
brought researchers from China and the 
Arab Gulf states together and added a few 
other researchers who focus more broadly 
on China’s new approach to the international 
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economy and foreign and security policy, as 
well as on confronting extremism. 
We are grateful to the participants in the 
conference for agreeing to summarize their 
presentations in the form of short papers, 
thus making it possible to disseminate the 
conclusions of the conference to a broader 
audience.   
Energy and commercial interests as main 
drivers
Whereas China once viewed developments 
and events in the Middle East primarily 
through the lens of a revolutionary ideology, 
its relations with Middle Eastern states are 
now driven mainly by energy and commercial 
interests. It has a strong and growing need 
for access to energy and natural resources 
in order to maintain economic growth. The 
Middle East, in particular the Persian Gulf, is 
the main region involved, with Saudi Arabia 
and Iran both being major suppliers of oil to 
China. The Persian Gulf as a whole is China’s 
largest oil provider, and it is estimated that 
by 2020 annual trade between China and the 
Persian Gulf will top $350 billion. A free-trade 
agreement with China is also a priority for 
the GCC, and Chinese state-owned compa-
nies are continuously bidding for contracts 
in the Persian Gulf. There is a clear Chinese 
presence in regional commerce. 
The Middle East has thus been China’s ma-
jor oil and gas supplier, and it falls into the 
category of ‘China’s greater neighborhood’ 
as far as Chinese foreign policy is con-
cerned. At the same time, China is diversi-
fying its energy suppliers among regional 
states and states outside the region, as 
well as developing new supply routes and 
port facilities. According to Jiadong Zhang, 
China needs to rethink its policy towards 
the Middle East because of the declining oil 
price, terrorist threats and the lower de-
mand expected for fossil fuels in the future. 
Marc Lanteigne instead sees China’s energy 
consumption shifting away from domestic 
coal to cleaner, imported fossil fuels. For 
the foreseeable future, however, Zhang and 
Lanteigne agree that the region remains im-
portant for China’s energy security, as well 
as for other commercial interests, as part 
of the trade route to Europe and Africa, and 
also as export markets in their own right. 
This is also significant in that several of the 
regional states are also members of the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
one of the new China-sponsored internation-
al development banks that are seeking to 
expand infrastructure investment through 
international collaboration. 
Compared to its limited involvement in 
security, China is aggressively and steadily 
consolidating energy and other commercial 
ties with the region. Marc Lanteigne’s paper 
discusses China’s energy diplomacy in the 
Greater Middle East. Although perceived as 
hypocritical by some regional actors for just 
taking the economic benefits without military 
involvement, China’s pursuit of economic 
interests without security involvement has 
achieved significant results, in particular in 
diversifying the energy trade for China and 
in establishing itself as a pivotal alternative 
consumer for the region. Regional instabil-
ities, including the Arab Spring and the rise 
of Islamic State, call into question the status 
of the Middle East as a provider of ‘energy 
security’ to China. However, as the most im-
portant region for energy supply, the Greater 
Middle East is a focus of China’s economic 
diplomacy, including through a free-trade 
agreement with the GCC, involvement in 
OBOR and membership in AIIB. 
In particular, several papers stress that Chi-
na’s ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and ‘21st-cen-
tury Maritime Silk Road’ (Belt and Road or 
OBOR) initiative is giving another boost to 
relations between China and the greater 
Middle East. China sees the region as a knot 
in the initiative. The OBOR initiative involves 
the Greater Middle East in both terrestrial and 
maritime routes as both important points 
of connectivity and economic partners. But 
because the definition of the initiative is still 
vague and ever changing in its scope, states 
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in the region continue to compete for China’s 
favor.
To intervene or not to intervene
The principle of non-intervention is one of 
China’s key traditional foreign and security 
policy guidelines. Due especially to China’s 
expanding global role, interests and capa-
bilities, however, adhering to this principle is 
becoming increasingly challenging for Chi-
nese leaders. 
Generally, China has started to interfere in 
developments and conflicts in other regions 
and states. In response to several interna-
tional conflicts and crises, Chinese leaders 
have presented diplomatic suggestions and 
offered to play a mediating role. Beijing still 
insists that it is sticking to the principle of 
non-intervention. It is clear, however, that the 
current Chinese foreign and security policy 
constitutes a more flexible and pragmatic 
Chinese interpretation – and implementation 
– of the principle of non-intervention. 
As Camilla T. N. Sørensen notes, China is 
becoming more pragmatic and flexible in 
its diplomatic approach toward the Greater 
Middle East. Growing energy and commercial 
interests and ties are resulting in a new pres-
ence and a great-power role for China in the 
Middle East, which coincides with the latter’s 
growing expectations of China’s ability and 
willingness to play a stabilizing role in region-
al affairs. The regional states, on the other 
hand, increasingly look to China as a provider 
of global and regional public goods. 
However, in contrast to the clear Chinese 
presence in regional commerce, China is 
playing a small, albeit growing role in regional 
politics and security. The Chinese leadership 
is still very careful and uncertain about how 
to put its growing capabilities and influence 
in the region into play and to what extent. In 
short, China’s role and activities in regional 
politics and security are growing, but this 
is more out of necessity than as part of an 
overall strategic ambition or plan. 
Like many other states outside the region, 
China has had to make a rapid adjustment to 
its Middle East approach and policies follow-
ing the Arab Spring. Beijing still is attempt-
ing to retain a neutral stance on the many 
conflicts and uprisings in the region, while it 
continues to seek to improve economic as 
well as political relations in the region. How-
ever, China’s neutral stance is increasingly 
being challenged and is leading to criticism 
both inside and outside the region. For exam-
ple, China’s unwillingness to support harder 
sanctions against Syria’s President Assad 
has been sharply criticized by the US and 
Europe, as well as by several Arab govern-
ments. Such criticism has contributed to a 
more active Chinese approach and growing 
conflict-mediation efforts. For example, 
China came up with the four-point proposal 
for Syria in late 2012, calling on all sides to 
stop fighting and initiate a political transition 
and an inclusive economic development 
process. The proposal, however, generated 
little international interest. In May 2013, China 
also sought to take a more active role in 
relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with 
a four-point proposal – similar to that involv-
ing the conflict in Syria – calling for a peace-
ful resolution to the conflict and stressing 
diplomatic dialogue and inclusive economic 
development. Consequently, China has be-
come much more actively involved in conflict 
mediation in the Middle East in recent years, 
as Miwa Hirono also points out in relation to 
the development of the Chinese approach 
and policies towards Afghanistan.   
That is, China’s diplomatic skills are becom-
ing more sophisticated as its interests be-
come more widely spread geographically and 
multifaceted. Still, China is playing a wait-
and-see game in the region when it comes to 
political and military conflicts. China usually 
presents itself as impartial, neither govern-
ment-biased nor rebel-biased, and builds 
on the assumption that both or all sides are 
responsible for the initiation, escalation and 
solution to the conflict. Chinese proposals 
often have a focus on building trust and the 
necessary conditions for inclusive economic 
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development, that is, economic development 
that includes and benefits all sides in a con-
flict so that it becomes too costly for all sides 
to return to violence. Chinese proposals and 
mediation strategies often refrain from taking 
a position on the question of right or wrong 
and hence on who to blame.  
Jiadong Zhang’s chapter represents a widely 
held Chinese perspective that China is re-
garded as a fair arbitrator in the region. China 
prides itself in helping broker the nuclear deal 
between Iran and the P5 Plus One. However, 
to some regional states, China’s reluctance to 
pick sides means siding with the other side. 
Taking no risk can be the greatest risk for Chi-
na, as both Imad Mansour and N. Janardhan 
point out.
Regarding what capabilities to put into play, 
China, unlike the US, does not have formal 
alliances in the Middle East or air and na-
val bases in the region. And despite recent 
advances, the Chinese navy and air force 
still cannot match those of the US. It has, 
however, other forms of leverage such as its 
growing economic influence and the attrac-
tiveness of access to its market and to its 
investments and aid. Beijing has started to 
use such leverage more proactively to protect 
and promote Chinese security, political and 
economic interests, as well as Chinese citi-
zens and their activities in the Middle East.  
Filling the vacuum created by US 
withdrawal: balancing games 
In the context of the reduced US presence in 
the region, its ‘pivot to Asia’ and the shift of 
economic power from the West to the East 
as perceived by the region, both China and 
states in the Greater Middle East are pursuing 
balanced diplomacy and playing balancing 
games. 
Compared with the earlier ideological bias in 
its foreign policy, China is enhancing ties with 
a wide array of states and regional organisa-
tions in the Greater Middle East regardless 
whether they are allies of the US or whether 
they are friends with each other, including 
Iran and the GCC states, Israel and Palestine, 
and Iraq and United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
Moreover, as Jiadong Zhang argues, China 
now also needs to balance its relations with 
the Middle East and its own global image and 
status. 
The states in the region are also playing a 
balancing game between the US and China. 
There is a general trend in the region to ‘look 
East’, building ties with Asia and particular-
ly China. Despite their efforts to be more 
independent in security policy, the GCC 
states have not succeeded in this, nor have 
they developed a unified security frame-
work. They still rely on the major powers, 
in particular the US, to provide security, but 
Imad Mansour does not see an opportunity 
for China to become a security pillar for the 
region in the foreseeable future: it will not set 
the parameters of regional security archi-
tectures, as the US has so far done. There 
is neither the supply of the role of pillar by 
China, nor a demand for such a role by the 
GCC, not least because there are important 
points of divergence in the security perspec-
tives between the two sides, and China’s 
perceived avoidance of regional conflicts 
and competition is also seen as an impedi-
ment. Personal ties and understandings of 
each other’s political mind-sets take years to 
cultivate as well, as Mansour suggests. Along 
similar lines, Jiadong Zhang concludes that 
in the foreseeable future China will not serve 
as a substitute for the US due to ‘China’s 
limited capacity and self-restrained tradition-
al culture’. Marc Lanteign is more optimistic 
that China can quickly close its knowledge 
gap about the complexity of the region. All 
authors underline the importance of mutu-
al understanding and deep engagement in 
enhancing relations between China and the 
states in the Persian Gulf.
While N. Janardhan argues that ‘the United 
States is worried about Chinese inroads in 
the Middle East’, he also underlines that there 
is the potential for great-power cooperation 
in Middle East affairs too. He specifically 
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observes that the cooperative relationship 
built up between ‘the U.S. and Russia-China 
duo’ to reach a deal on Iran could be repeat-
ed, together with the GCC, to reach a deal on 
Syria.
Summary
In short, there are growing expectations in 
the region of China’s ability and willingness 
to play a stabilizing role in regional political 
and security affairs. The regional states 
increasingly also look to China as a provid-
er of global and regional public goods. The 
Chinese are not yet ready to play such a role 
and take on such responsibilities. One reason 
is that this risks conflicting with the long-held 
principle of non-intervention and also with 
China’s self-perception as a different kind 
of great power: in contrast to the Western 
great powers, China does not intervene in the 
politics of other regions and states, nor does 
it have alliances or military bases outside 
its own territory. Another reason is that the 
Chinese still do not have the diplomatic and 
military capabilities to play such a role – to 
fill the vacuum if the US withdraws from the 
region. There seems to be a clash of expec-
tations. On the one hand, China focuses on 
protecting and promoting its energy and 
commercial interests; in order to do so, it is 
willing to become more actively involved in 
regional politics and security. On the other 
hand, the regional states expect China to 
assume more holistic concerns about region-
al development, stability and security and 
to play a strong and active role in regional 
politics and security.
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CHINA’S DIPLOMACY IN THE GULF 
REGION:  ENERGY AND (IN)SECURITY
Marc Lanteigne
نيصلا يف ولو ملعلا بلطإ
(‘Seek knowledge, even in China.’) 
Traditional hadith
China’s Middle East Challenges
Since the 1990s, China’s foreign and security 
policy has significantly diversified to include 
the issue of energy security, especially as 
Beijing began to seek deepened partnerships 
with energy-producing states and regions, 
including in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA). Unlike the histories of the United 
States, Europe and Japan, China’s history 
in Middle Eastern affairs has been much 
shorter and as a result, Beijing is developing 
energy relationships with MENA at a disad-
vantage with respect to its knowledge of and 
diplomacy with the region. At the same time, 
China’s longstanding practice of separating 
economics from politics in its cross-regional 
diplomacy, and especially in its relations with 
resource-rich developing states, has at times 
failed in the Middle East, most particularly in 
addressing responses to violence-prone weak 
states such as Libya and Yemen, and the 
more venomous security situation in Iraq and 
Syria. China has made great strides in widen-
ing and deepening its MENA policies under 
the governments of Hu Jintao and more 
recently Xi Jinping. Nonetheless, assuming a 
traditional non-aligned stance in many of the 
political and security issues and problems 
enveloping the Middle East, and especially 
since the post-‘Arab Spring’ period, due to its 
established great power status, has proven to 
be considerably more difficult for China. 
 
There are some areas of MENA, including 
in the oil-producing Gulf region, in which 
China has been more successful in navigat-
ing local politics while avoiding the political 
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traps previously encountered by other large 
fossil fuel-consuming states, most notably 
Iran and South Sudan. However, both with 
the fall of global oil prices during 2015 and 
China’s developing status as a great power 
and major energy player, Beijing struggles to 
separate politics from economics in the Gulf 
region while building an effective energy 
security strategy involving the six govern-
ments represented on the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC).1 Energy politics will continue 
to take the lead in this area for the foresee-
able future as China takes a long-term view 
of its concerns about access to external 
supplies. 
As China continues to grow as a political 
and economic power, the country is more 
aware of its growing dependence on import-
ed fossil fuels as it seeks to distance itself 
from environmentally damaging indigenous 
coal. Deteriorating air quality in the past 
few years, culminating in ‘red alerts’ of high 
levels of air pollution in the Chinese capital 
during December 2015,2 have underscored 
the need for China to focus on diversifying 
its energy sources while seeking a more 
‘green’ energy agenda. The Middle East, in-
cluding the Gulf region, is becoming a more 
important source of both oil and liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) for Chinese markets, and 
the GCC ? is slowly but steadily developing 
as a key energy partner for China. Within 
this relationship, Beijing has been seeking 
to diversify its diplomatic ties with the Gulf 
region alongside the potential for liberal-
ized trade between the two actors. Since 
the turn of the century, as China begins to 
expand its interests in developing bilateral 
and sub-regional free-trade agreements, 
free-trade talks between China and the GCC 
have continued, with both sides expressing 
1  The members of the Gulf Cooperation Council are Bah-
rain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates.
2  ‘Beijing’s Smog Red Alert Enters Third Day as Toxic Haze 
Shrouds City,’ Agence France-Presse / The Guardian, 21 De-
cember 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/
dec/21/beijings-smog-red-alert-enters-third-day-as-toxic-
haze-shrouds-city>.
hopes that a mutually satisfying agreement 
can be struck. 
China is also approaching the Gulf region 
in a stronger position from which to debate 
the issue of energy security, defined as the 
need for access to energy supplies in order 
to maintain economic stability and national 
security. As global energy prices began their 
slide in 2015, Beijing became an early bene-
ficiary of less expensive oil and gas supplies. 
Yet China is also well aware of the volatility 
of energy markets and the unpredictability of 
fossil-fuel markets, and remains committed 
to ensuring that the availability of external 
energy sources does not result in a large 
degree of vulnerability in China’s future eco-
nomic growth and modernization. 
This paper will examine how China’s develop-
ing policy of maintaining energy security has 
begun to form part of the dialogue between 
Beijing and the major states of the Gulf 
region, and whether Chinese views of energy 
security will differ from those of the West. 
Beijing has had to play catch-up in engaging 
the Gulf and in developing a deeper under-
standing of the complex diplomatic dynamics 
of the GCC, but this knowledge gap is quickly 
being closed, and energy security will be at 
the forefront of any bilateral dialogue between 
China and the Gulf states in the near future. 
China and Gulf Politics
The (Arabian / Persian) Gulf region, along 
with the greater MENA area, was an early 
beneficiary of the cross-regional diplomacy 
initiated by Beijing under the government of 
Hu Jintao (2002-12). As with other regions, 
notably Africa and Central Asia, energy and 
raw materials formed a platform for many 
of the diplomatic initiatives that China un-
dertook in the Middle East, but there were 
ambitious attempts by China to further widen 
its policies in the region. It was during this 
period that the China–Arab Cooperation 
Forum (CACF) was created to act as a link 
between Beijing and the League of Arab 
States (LAS). Since 2004, the CACF has held 
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biennial governmental conferences, the 
most recent in Beijing in June 2014.3 At 
the same time there was an emphasis on 
the development of greater bilateral ties 
between China and Middle Eastern govern-
ments, including energy-producing states. 
During the Hu administration and the 
first years of the presidency of Xi Jinping, 
summitry between Beijing and Middle East 
policy-makers was frequent. Since 2004, 
China’s relations with the Gulf states have 
also been dominated by efforts to develop 
a free-trade agreement with the Gulf Coop-
eration Council,4 efforts which have been 
complicated by economic differences and 
occasionally by politics. 
Following a June 2009 negotiation meet-
ing in Riyadh, FTA talks were temporarily 
suspended due to concerns within the 
GCC about Beijing’s unwillingness to open 
its petrochemical sector to firms from the 
Gulf region.5 Since that time, the Chinese 
government has called for greater flexibility 
and has been supportive of reaching a quick 
conclusion to the negotiations. Part of the 
reason for this is the major role the Gulf 
States play in overall Chinese trade with the 
Middle East. Between 2004 and 2014, this 
trade increased from approximately US$20 
billion to US$230 billion, with seventy per-
cent being represented by the GCC member-
ship. As well, one third of China’s imported 
oil now is derived from the GCC states, with 
Saudi Arabia being the most visible partner.6 
The successful completion of a free-trade 
agreement would further deepen these ties, 
while bringing the region close to the Xi 
government’s ‘belt and road’ (yidai yilu 一带
一路) trade routes, a concept which began to 
take form after 2013. Both the ‘belt’, meaning 
a series of overland trade routes connecting 
China with Europe via Eurasia, and the ‘road’, 
referring to maritime trading routes through 
the Indian Ocean between China on the one 
hand and Africa and Europe on the other, 
would involve the participation of MENA and 
Gulf governments. As a result, China has 
been anxious to conclude the FTA with the 
GCC (along with Sri Lanka) as a means of 
further cementing its ‘one belt and one road’ 
initiative.7 In addition, several Middle Eastern 
and North African countries agreed to join 
the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) in early 2015, including Iran, Israel and 
Jordan, as well as the Gulf States of Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates. 
The Chinese government has occasionally 
found it difficult to separate its Gulf diplomacy 
from its relations with the wider Middle East, 
especially in the wake of conflict and insta-
bility, along with the rise of the Islamic State 
(also known as Daesh) in much of the Mashriq 
region, especially Iraq and Syria. Like many 
other outside actors, China had to make rapid 
adjustments to its regional diplomacy as a 
result of the 2011-12 ‘Arab Spring’ people’s 
protests, which unseated many longstand-
ing regional governments, including those of 
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, and resulted 
in widespread violence and eventually civil 
war in Syria between the government of Pres-
ident Bashar Assad and various rebel groups 
seeking his removal. 
Beijing’s attempts to maintain a non-aligned 
policy at the start of the conflict were ad-
versely affected in February 2012 when, 
along with Russia, China vetoed a UNSC 
resolution calling for Syrian President Assad 
to resign in the wake of the worsening vio-
3  Shannon Tiezzi, ‘China Seeks Expanded Role in Middle 
East,’ The Diplomat, 4 June 2014, <http://thediplomat.
com/2014/06/china-seeks-expanded-role-in-middle-
east/>.
4  ‘China FTA Network: Gulf Cooperation Council,’ Ministry 
of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, June 2009 
<http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/engcc.shtml>.
5  Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg, ‘China-GCC Strategic Dialogue 
Resumes,’ Arab News, 19 January 2014, <http://www.
arabnews.com/news/511401>.
6  ‘Soft Power- China’s Expanding Role in the Middle East,’ 
Deutsche Welle, 4 February 2015. 
7  Chen Jia, ‘ “Belt and Road” Plan “Set to Spur FTA Talks”,’ 
China Daily (Europe), 28 April 2015, <http://europe.china-
daily.com.cn/china/2015-04/28/content_20558913.htm>; 
Salah Takieddine, ‘China Hand in Hand with Arab World to 
Push Silk Road Initiative,’ Xinhua, 27 May 2015. 
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lence. By the end of 2014, China and Russia 
had vetoed four separate UNSC resolutions 
which sought to address the Syrian conflict.8 
Beijing justified its decision by suggesting 
that overt support for one side in the dispute 
would only lead to a further deterioration of 
conditions in Syria, but many Arab govern-
ments, including those in the Gulf, were not 
completely convinced. China’s veto and its 
unwillingness to support deeper sanctions 
were sharply criticized in the United States 
and Europe and were greeted with unease 
among other Arab governments. Relations 
became especially difficult with Saudi Arabia 
over China’s refusal to support a more con-
certed pressure against the Assad regime, 
further contributing to the sluggish pace of 
the free-trade talks between China and the 
GCC after 2011.9 
The events of 2014-15, when Islamic State 
(IS) began to carve out territory in Iraq and 
Syria in the hopes of founding an Islamic ca-
liphate, erasing the two states’ mutual border 
in the process, has also posed a dilemma for 
Beijing. Although declining to formally join 
the Washington-led coalition to combat IS, 
China has joined the international community 
in condemning the movement and has raised 
concerns about a possible demonstration ef-
fect being created in the far-western Chinese 
territory of Xinjiang. More specifically, Beijing 
was concerned that the radicalism being 
spread by IS would find sympathy among 
extremists in China’s far west. Reports which 
surfaced in November 2015 that a Chinese 
hostage had been beheaded by IS further 
indicated that Beijing was not immune to the 
effects of the deteriorating security situation 
in the Mashriq.10  
8  ‘Russia and China Veto UN Move to Refer Syria to ICC,’ 
BBC News, 22 May 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-middle-east-27514256>.
9  ‘China and GCC to Restart FTA Negotiations,’ Gulf States 
News, 7 February 2014, <http://www.gsn-online.com/
china-and-gcc-to-restart-fta-negotiations>.
10  Shannon Tiezzi, ‘ISIS: Chinese Hostage “Executed”.’ 
The Diplomat, 19 November 2015, <http://thediplomat.
com/2015/11/isis-chinese-hostage-executed/>.
While President Xi has, so far, been a less 
involved participant in Middle Eastern sum-
mitry in comparison with his predecessor, 
officials in his government have been more 
active in the region. For example, in Janu-
ary 2014, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi 
made a highly publicized tour of the Middle 
East, including Saudi Arabia.11 Xi himself had 
planned a visit to Egypt and Saudi Arabia in 
April 2015, which would have been his first to 
the Middle East, but the arrangements had to 
be postponed due to the worsening fighting 
between the Saudi-backed government of 
Yemen and Shi’ite Houthi rebels, who had 
established a rival government in Sana’a, and 
other splinter groups loyal to IS.12 Despite the 
comparative lack, so far, of summit diploma-
cy in the region, the Xi government continues 
to view the MENA region, including the Gulf, 
not only as an important source of energy 
and resources, but also as an important 
component of the emerging belt and road 
initiative after 2013. 
The Energy Factor
Trade in commodities has also dominated 
the Sino-MENA relationship, including in the 
Gulf, as Beijing now views the region as an 
excellent source of raw materials, including 
phosphate, manganese, cobalt and fibres, for 
China’s burgeoning textile sector.13 As did the 
United States and Europe in the past, China 
has paid very close attention to the Middle 
East as a source of fossil fuels, and much of 
Beijing’s diplomacy in the region has focused 
on energy trade. Notwithstanding its ‘late-
comer’ status and its need to gather more 
political and economic information quickly 
about its GCC partners, Beijing has been 
11  ‘Wang Yi Gave an Interview to Al-Jazeera,’ Foreign 
Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, 9 January 2014, 
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/
wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1116509.shtml>
12  ‘China state Visit to Egypt, Saudi Arabia Delayed,’ Cairo 
Post, 1 April 2015, <http://thecairopost.youm7.com/
news/144403/news/china-state-visit-to-egypt-saudi-
arabia-delayed>.
13  Gouda Abdel Khalek, ‘The Impact of China on the Middle 
East,’ Journal of Developing Societies 23(4) (2007): 425.
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successful in establishing itself as a pivot-
al ‘alternative’ consumer base for the Gulf 
region’s oil and gas. Despite China’s attempts 
to diversify its energy partners mentioned 
above, the Gulf region remains its primary 
source of imported oil and gas. By 2013 
Beijing’s primary regional oil suppliers were in 
the Gulf region, especially Saudi Arabia, Iran 
and Qatar, and increasingly Iraq and Yemen, 
although the latter two states became less 
viable as energy partners after their security 
situations deteriorated in 2014-15. Beijing 
then looked to other parts of the Gulf region 
to be more stable politically in comparison.  
China, like the other large energy-consuming 
powers, had a vested interest in ensuring en-
ergy exports from the region were maintained 
even as prices began to drop. While through-
out much of the Cold War, China’s interests in 
the Middle East were ideological and stra-
tegic, more economic issues began to gain 
prominence as China recognized the need to 
import fossil fuels, and Beijing, acknowledg-
ing the economic consequences of favour-
ing either side over the other, has sought 
a balance in its policies on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. The size of the Chinese market and 
its growing economic decision-making ca-
pabilities internationally make it unlikely that 
Beijing would be subject to a fuel embargo.14 
The strong American presence in the region, 
not only in Iraq, and also Washington’s estab-
lished (albeit wavering) political ties with Ri-
yadh, does present a challenge for long-term 
Chinese energy diplomacy. However, growing 
Chinese power and interests in the region do 
raise the possibility of more direct diplomatic 
competition in MENA between the two great 
powers.15 Saudi Arabia may increasingly view 
China as a counterweight to the west, while 
ensuring that ties to American and European 
markets are not seriously damaged. Cooling 
US–Saudi relations, especially in the wake of 
the diplomatic convergence between the Unit-
ed States and Iran in 2015-16, further raised 
anxieties in Riyadh about the health of its 
American ties. 
As noted previously, China has been more 
inclined to view liquefied natural gas as 
a cleaner alternative to coal, and growing 
demand for imported LNG had until recently 
been a major factor in Chinese relations with 
Qatar. In terms of overall trade the relation-
ship has been a healthy one, with volume 
growing from US$400 million in 2004 to 
US$10.6 billion ten years later.16 However, Chi-
na’s economic slowdown during 2015, as well 
as its move away from a concentration and 
more toward the service sectors, has had the 
additional effect of slowing Chinese demand 
for natural gas supplies.17 Despite high hopes 
that LNG demand in China would spike in 
2015 as a result of environmental concerns, 
the levelling off of imports, coupled with gas 
prices that remain high in China itself, did not 
bring about this anticipated scenario. Qatar is 
the largest external supplier of LNG to China, 
but trade dropped slightly in 2013-14, from 
6.76 million metric tonnes to 6.73 million,18 
and the volatility of the energy market makes 
further predictions for future demand dif-
ficult. In early 2016, the Qatari government 
announced that, like Saudi Arabia, it was 
seeking to diversify its economy away from a 
high dependence on fossil fuels. China would 
be an important partner in this diversification 
process, especially regarding Qatar’s industri-
al sectors.19
14  Zha Daojiong, ‘China’s Energy Security: Domestic and In-
ternational Issues,’ Survival 48(1) (Spring 2006): 179-90.
15  Flynt Leveritt and Jeffrey Bader, ‘Managing China-US 
Energy Competition in the Middle East,’ The Washington 
Quarterly 29(1) (Winter 2005-6): 195-6; G. John Ikenberry, 
‘Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and 
Middle State Strategies in East Asia,’ Political Science 
Quarterly 131(1) (Spring 2016): 9-43. 
16  ‘Qatar – China Trade Volume Hits QR38.6bn in 2014,’ The 
Peninsula, 17 December 2015. 
17  ‘China’s Natural Gas Use Plummets Despite its Pledge to 
Switch from Coal,’ Syrian Arab News Agency, 11 December 
2015. 
18  Colin Shek, ‘China’s gas-import slowdown threatens 
LNG producers,’ Al-Jazeera, 2 June 2015, < http://
www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/06/
china-gas-import-slowdown-threatens-lng-produc-
ers-150602104833809.html>.
19  Peter Alagos, ‘China Seen as Playing a Key Role in Qa-
tar’s Diversification strategy,’ Gulf Times, 22 May 2016. 
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China has also sought to maintain energy 
relations with Iran, despite an ongoing inter-
national campaign led by the United States 
to isolate and sanction Tehran, especially 
in light of concerns about possible Iranian 
nuclear weapons development. China has 
been seen as a primary investor in Iranian 
energy infrastructure, much of which had 
deteriorated in the wake of US-led sanctions 
since the 1980s. Subsequent Chinese deals 
in Iran included a 2004 investment agree-
ment in the Yadavaran area and a 2007 joint 
venture to develop natural gas in the North 
Pars region.20 Iran’s status as a primary 
producer of fossil fuels meant that Beijing 
felt it could ill afford to ignore the benefits 
of maintaining economic ties with Tehran 
even during the sanctions era. Once those 
sanctions began to be lifted in 2015, Beijing 
was quick to suggest new potential trade and 
development deals, the cornerstone being an 
economic partnership to increase bilateral 
trade to US$600 billion over the next quar-
ter of a century.21 However, with the United 
States and Europe also eyeing the Iranian 
post-sanctions market, it remains to be seen 
whether Beijing can maintain the same de-
gree of visibility in Iranian trade. As well, Iran 
may become a key component of the ‘one 
belt and one road’ plan, given the country’s 
strategic location along both the overland 
and sea routes. 
As with other parts of the Gulf region, Beijing 
has sought to expand its diplomacy with Iran 
beyond strictly matters of energy. In April 
2015, an initial breakthrough was reached 
between Tehran and the ‘P5 Plus One’ group-
ing, which included China along with the US, 
Russia, and western European governments, 
that would impose restrictions on the Iranian 
20  Marc Lanteigne, ‘Energising Links,’ The World Today 63(7) 
(July 2007): 7; Alyssa Rallis, ‘China–Iran Trade to Hit 
US$25 Billion,’ Global Insight Daily Analysis, 1 July 2008. 
21  Golnar Motevalli, ‘China, Iran Agree to Expand Trade to 
$600 Billion in a Decade,’ Bloomberg, 23 January 2016, < 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-23/
china-iran-agree-to-expand-trade-to-600-billion-in-a-de-
cade>.
22  ‘China Urges Flexibility in Iran Nuclear Talks,’ Reuters / 
International Herald Tribune, 18 July 2008, 3; ‘Full Text of 
the Iran Nuclear Deal,’ Washington Post, 14 July 2015, < 
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/
full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1651/>.
nuclear programme under international su-
pervision. Beijing has been supportive of this 
process and has expressed hopes that the 
tentative nuclear deal signed with Iran in July 
2015 would see Teheran finally emerge from 
international isolation. Beijing had tradition-
ally resisted the use of economic coercion or 
the threat of force to settle this issue main-
taining the view a diplomatic dialogue is the 
best way to prevent a potential nuclear cri-
sis.22 It remains to be seen, however, how the 
warming of relations between Iran and the 
west will affect Sino-Iranian energy relations 
in the coming years. 
What’s Next?
Although fossil-fuel prices were continuing 
to fall at the end of 2015, China continued to 
build an energy security policy in light of its 
growing dependence on outside fossil-fuel 
sources in order to maintain growth and 
continue its process of domestic econom-
ic reform. Beijing will therefore continue to 
seek deeper relations with a diverse array of 
energy partners, especially in regions which 
are considered stable. In the case of the Gulf, 
although the region’s monarchies were able 
to ride out the turmoil of the Arab Spring 
protests relatively intact, the conflicts of the 
greater MENA region, including Libya, the 
Islamic State crisis and Yemen, continue to 
chip away at the walls of the GCC and call 
into question the security of the energy rela-
tionship between China and the Gulf region. 
As well, China remains a recent arrival in the 
game of Middle Eastern energy relations, now 
having to compete with many western actors 
that have engaged with the Gulf for decades 
and have much more multifaceted economic 
ties with the Gulf economies. 
A wild card in the China–GCC relationship 
remains their mutual free-trade negotiations, 
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which will be an important additional step 
in the development of this bilateral linkage. 
The negotiations appear to be back on track 
due to growing summit diplomacy between 
Chinese officials and local Gulf governments, 
and a successful visit to the region by Presi-
dent Xi, expected in 2016, would likely elevate 
the process to an even better position. China 
has been successful in concluding difficult 
free-trade talks in recent years, including with 
the large economies of Australia and South 
Korea in 2015, and Beijing is very interested 
in further cementing its cross-regional eco-
nomic diplomacy by adding the GCC to its list 
of free trade successes. 
After much delay, President Xi was finally 
able to tour the Middle East in January 2016, 
visiting Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia. At the 
top of the list of Xi’s interests during the tour 
were energy deals, as well as broader inter-
ests in expanding Chinese trade in the region. 
In his speech to the Arab League in Cairo 
during his trip, President Xi sought to stress 
the economic dimension of China’s region-
al partnership while seeking to avoid the 
impression that Beijing was seeking to fill a 
supposed ‘power vacuum’.23 As well, many of 
China’s emerging Middle East policies have 
begun to be integrated into a larger ‘one belt 
and one road’ strategy, which has included 
developing stronger maritime trade ties with 
the Middle East and North Africa. At the end 
of 2015, China also announced its intentions 
to construct a logistics centre across from 
the Gulf Region in Djibouti,24 another sign 
that Beijing is placing a higher priority on 
trade security in the region and subtly bal-
ancing the west there. As China deepens its 
economic and energy relations with MENA, 
it will integrate key parts of the Gulf region 
more fully into these diplomatic processes. 
Ultimately, however, it will be energy in the 
form of oil and LNG that will continue to set 
the tone for the growing diplomatic process 
between China and the Gulf, as Beijing devel-
ops its role as the alternative pole in region. 
23  Cary Huang, ’Back to the Future: Chinese Presi-
dent Xi Jinping’s Middle East Visit ... and His Middle 
Kingdom Dream,’ South China Morning Post, 22 Jan-
uary 2016’; Spotlight: Xi’s Speech at Arab League 
Charts Course for China-Arab Cooperation,’ Xinhua, 
28 January 2016, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/en-
glish/2016-01/28/c_135052464.htm>.
24  ‘China Hints More Bases On Way after Djibouti,’ Reuters, 
8 March 2016. 
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CAN CHINA BE A PILLAR OF GCC 
SECURITY?
Imad Mansour
Increasing China’s political involvement glob-
ally and expanding China–Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) trade in hydrocarbons have 
been hypothesized by some as the precur-
sors of an expanded relationship between 
the two sides in the security realm. In fact, 
since at least 2004, GCC leaders have been 
establishing contacts with their Chinese 
counterparts to discuss the potential and 
parameters for what they term ‘a strategic 
partnership’. These developments, together 
with apparent GCC questioning of current 
American policies toward the Gulf, make 
this an opportune moment to explore Chi-
na’s potential contributions to GCC security, 
asking the pertinent question of what China 
can offer to buttress the security interests 
of GCC states. Can China be a pillar of GCC 
security? By pillar is meant more than an ally 
or provider of military capabilities or weap-
ons systems; rather, as a pillar, a major power 
would be central in setting the parameters of 
the regional order and/or organizing regional 
security architectures. How should we think 
about the possibility of a committed security 
relationship of this sort, and what alternative 
relationships are likely?  
In this paper I consider the question of 
whether China could be a pillar of GCC secu-
rity in four steps: first, I look at the reasons 
why China is often discussed as a security 
partner; second, I examine the historical 
roots of two security-seeking strategies on 
the part of the GCC; third, I undertake a pre-
liminary consideration of GCC decision-mak-
ers’ positions on security ties with China; and 
fourth, I discuss what China could offer. 
Dimension one: China as a policy interest
Three global and regional factors help us 
understand the growing interest in what 
China can offer. First is the GCC’s question-
ing of American commitments to its security 
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in light of what it sees as America’s unfa-
vourable policies on Iran, Syria and Iraq. The 
second factor is the American ‘pivot to Asia’, 
which, while not meaning abandonment, 
nevertheless has GCC states thinking of the 
trade-offs the United States (US) would be 
willing to make in pursuit of its interests that 
would compromise its presence in the Gulf. 
The third factor is China’s tactical expansion 
into the Gulf and areas in the vicinity of the 
GCC, which have further animated talk about 
China’s potential in ensuring the GCC’s secu-
rity; these moves include conducting training 
with Turkey and Iran, developing ties with the 
UAE and talk of China establishing a base in 
Djibouti. In essence, from the perspective of 
the GCC, China has become more present 
regionally, but without a concerted policy in 
which it presents itself as a security partner, 
let alone a pillar of regional security. 
Dimension two: historicizing GCC security 
strategies 
GCC states have sought security for them-
selves through alliances with major powers, 
as well as intra-GCC coordination of capaci-
ties. Alignments with major powers predated 
the formation of most of the GCC sovereign 
states, and were often developed as means 
to offset rivalries between regional or local 
leaders and families; such alignments pre-
dated even the discovery of oil in the Gulf 
early in the twentieth century, with the British 
building or enforcing local alliances to secure 
trade routes to India. In the twentieth century, 
Britain and the US continued to be involved 
in local rivalries, helped develop the oil and 
gas sectors, especially through supporting 
expatriate companies, and aided state-build-
ing processes generally after independence. 
America’s current security presence in 
the Gulf developed over the course of the 
mid-twentieth century, starting most con-
cretely with its intervention to bridge Saudi 
Arabia and Iran ties in its ‘twin pillar’ strategy 
of the 1970s.
Simultaneously, visions of intra-GCC secu-
rity architecture were motivated by a drive 
to reduce dependence on the major powers 
and external assistance more generally. The 
idea of consolidating an indigenous security 
structure that was relatively independent of 
the major powers was circulating among 
Gulf Arab leaders as early as the early 1970s. 
However, pressures from Iran’s policies in 
the aftermath of the 1979 revolution and the 
onset of the Iran–Iraq War converged to lead 
the GCC states to agree to accept the United 
States as an order-setter in Gulf relations, 
especially in being their main security provid-
er. This did not prevent local security-building 
initiatives, one important and progressing 
achievement being the Peninsula Shield 
Force (PSF). However, GCC states have not 
yet developed a unified military and security 
framework, nor one that is independent of 
major power assistance. 
Major powers have therefore long been part 
and parcel of Gulf politics and security. The 
possibility of China partaking more concrete-
ly in Gulf security, therefore, is nothing new. 
What is important, however, is how China can 
be part of the regional order, and whether it 
has what the GCC wants?
Dimension three: the limitations on China 
being a GCC security pillar
Despite China’s increased presence in the 
Gulf and in policy discussions, I contend that 
existing indicators all point to a reality that, 
for the foreseeable future, it will not be a 
security pillar for the GCC: that is, it will not 
fix the parameters of regional security archi-
tectures, as the US has done so far. This is 
because China is not prepared to supply the 
role of being a pillar, nor is there any demand 
for such a role on the part of the GCC. 
The GCC states and their supporters among 
the major powers to date, Britain and the US, 
have so far had significant common grounds 
on which they agree and converge in their 
strategic perspectives on Gulf security, de-
spite occasional disagreement on the specif-
ics. This has been especially true with regard 
to the views of the GCC, the US and Britain 
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concerning who is menacing the regional 
order and who are their potential allies or 
friends. Aside from agreeing to develop trade 
in energy (and, to a lesser degree, financial 
investments), points of convergence between 
China and the GCC along these three dimen-
sions today are unclear. Actually, the security 
interests of the GCC states remain focused 
on guarding against threats in their geo-
graphical vicinity: in particular, against Iran, 
Israel and of late Islamic State. Rather than 
convergence around these issues, there are 
important points of divergence with China 
that make a deeper security relationship 
difficult to achieve.
The GCC states see regional security through 
an Iran-centric prism: for them, China’s ‘neu-
trality’ in foreign policy in effect translates 
into greater coordination with Iran, which 
makes China less desirable as a security 
partner. However, this GCC convergence 
on Iran (last officially confirmed in the 16 
September 2014 meeting in Riyadh) does 
not preclude divergence within the GCC on 
strategies to deal with Iran. In addition to 
its established economic and military ties 
with Iran, China had played a role in bridging 
the American and Iranian positions on the 
nuclear issue, which did not sit well with the 
GCC. To this mediation was added Iran’s 
framing of its position on Syria as protecting 
the latter’s sovereignty and being in the in-
terests of ‘impartiality’: the GCC states seem 
to see these Chinese positions as resulting 
in support of the Iranian position across the 
Middle East. Some GCC observers even note 
that Iran might not have been able to counter 
US pressures if China had adopted a different 
position. Thus, against the backdrop of GCC 
security concerns vis-à-vis Iran, and in light 
of China’s statist logic, GCC decision-makers 
are unnerved by what they perceive to be the 
strong ties developing between China and 
Iran, which, importantly, are not paralleled by 
similar Chinese ties with them. 
Israel is also of interest to the GCC, which un-
derstands that Israel’s politics and veto pow-
er influences America’s Middle East strate-
gies, especially the potential for the sale of 
advanced military capabilities. While China 
has promised to sell arms to the GCC states, 
it does not seem likely that it would assist 
them in such sales to such a degree that 
they would achieve military parity with Israel, 
or to a degree that would alarm the US. GCC 
leaders understand that the US is very likely 
to continue to monitor and probably approve 
international arms sales to the Gulf and the 
Middle East in general. Moreover, GCC lead-
ers understand that China would not risk its 
relations with the US over this issue, and they 
themselves would not want to do anything to 
end American dominance in the Gulf. There-
fore, from this perspective GCC leaders view 
the role that China could play in Gulf security 
(at least in their favor) as limited. 
With respect to Islamic State (IS), Iraq and 
Syria, the GCC states are alarmed by IS’s abil-
ity to threaten their domestic stability directly 
and challenge their legitimacy (discursively 
and materially), explosions having been the 
most visible manifestation of IS’s intent to 
spread its operations more widely. In these 
respects, China’s potential has remained al-
most negligible and seems unlikely to change 
significantly in the medium term.
In sum, from the perspective of the GCC, Chi-
na has not developed clear positions or pol-
icies that would indicate a willingness to act 
to contain any Middle Eastern actor that the 
GCC perceives as threatening (especially Iran 
and Israel). Not only is China distant from 
the Gulf’s messy and rivalry-ridden politics, 
it is actively avoiding regional conflicts and 
competitions and confining itself to bene-
fiting from trade and economic exchanges; 
some GCC observers consider this Chinese 
position to be ‘hypocritical’. The concern here 
for the GCC is that China is committed to 
developing its relations with Iran and Israel, 
from which it has been benefiting hand-
somely from trade in goods, investments 
and technology. It is clear that the US figures 
prominently in how the GCC perceives its 
options in relation to the major powers. Since 
the 2015 Camp David meetings following the 
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Iran nuclear deal, GCC decision-makers have 
made clear their comfort with America being 
their security pillar, tensions notwithstanding. 
In general, GCC observers do not see recent 
tensions as definitive, but rather as transitory.
Dimension four: China’s potential for GCC 
security 
While currently there are few ‘concrete’ 
indicators that China is becoming a pillar of 
the GCC’s security, its more realistic con-
tributions to GCC security mainly concern 
two issues: 1) the diversification of weapons 
sources, always in line with US approval; and 
2) the consolidation and securing of trade. 
From the GCC’s perspective, it is already 
diversifying its arms suppliers, a process that 
implicates China; this does not make China 
a pillar of GCC security. Moreover, since the 
GCC needs to secure shipping routes for the 
export of its hydrocarbons to Asia, it needs 
better ties with China and other Asian states. 
Hence, it is not a matter of shifting major 
power alliances, but of improving across-the-
board relations.
Relative to security or military cooperation, 
it is clear that economic and trade relations 
between the GCC and China are bound to 
develop on firmer grounds, including com-
mitments relating to Chinese citizens moving 
to live and work abroad. China has been 
expanding its security presence in the Gulf, 
as well as in Africa, in order to protect its 
investments and help those of its citizens 
who are residents there, for example, in order 
to evacuate them from unstable zones if 
needed. Therefore, by protecting such in-
terests, China will give itself greater military 
and security visibility in the Gulf. Perhaps 
this aspect will be a viable medium for both 
China and the GCC to examine their common 
security interests. 
Conclusion 
In January 2016 China issued its first Arab 
Policy Paper (APP) in recognition of the 
expanding ties between these two parts of 
the world. The APP, interestingly, referenced 
ongoing economic projects, perhaps to indi-
cate successful models to be emulated, or to 
signal a significant level of conscious strategic 
coordination in its massive administrative 
body in dealing with issues of interest to Arab 
audiences. The APP mentions the One Belt, 
One Road (OBOR) project and its expected 
benefits, though without noting how the GCC 
fits with this project; this is curious, since the 
GCC, and the Gulf generally, were also not 
mentioned in the OBOR map issued by Xin-
hua in 2015. It might be the case that building 
such a network to incorporate GCC states 
needs a certain level of intra-Gulf coordination 
and security dialogue, at least between Iran 
and the GCC. President Xi Jinping’s com-
ments in Saudi Arabia in January 2016 during 
a Middle East tour did note an interest in in-
cluding GCC members; given Gulf tensions, it 
might indeed have been prudent for China not 
to have discussed strategy at this point. Then 
in February 2016, Iran and China inaugurated 
a massive international train route that will sig-
nificantly reduce transport times. It remains 
to be seen what sorts of trade routes may be 
developed between the GCC and China.
To go back to the APP, in it was an interesting 
mention of collaboration on maritime securi-
ty in the framework of the ongoing efforts of 
the ‘international community’: close observ-
ers of the GCC had previously posed ques-
tions as to why China does not develop – 
from the observer’s perspective – a policy on 
maritime Gulf security independently of the 
existing one led by the western powers (i.e. 
the international community). The observer’s 
note indicated how the GCC is processing 
China’s regional politics in tandem with 
what the GCC sees the latter is developing 
with other Gulf states, especially Iran. So far, 
China–Iran military exchanges have been 
visible, and economic exchanges between 
them are more diverse than China-GCC ones; 
this dynamic is likely to continue in the next 
few years.
In the absence of any cataclysmic devel-
opment or shock, GCC leaders are likely to 
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continue to assess the benefits of a security 
relationship with China through the prism of 
their enduring relationship with the US. That 
relationship includes hardware and training, 
as well as the personalized ties that Amer-
ican decision-makers have cultivated over 
decades, and is accompanied by high levels 
of GCC comfort in dealing with the American 
political mindset. Perhaps Chinese diploma-
cy, if it is interested, can ponder these dimen-
sions in developing its own policy towards 
the Gulf.
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CHINA-MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS: 
NEW CHALLENGES AND NEW 
APPROACHES
Zhang Jiadong
Typically, Chinese interests in the Middle East 
mainly cover four areas: energy, politics, the 
economy and geopolitics. Even though ener-
gy security is still China’s key concern in the 
region, its economic and political interests 
in the Middle East are also very important. 
In recent years, the role of the Middle East in 
the world has changed greatly due to the de-
clining oil price and the rising terrorist threat. 
But for China, the importance of the Middle 
East has not changed much. China’s energy 
dependence on the Middle East is increasing, 
as is the Middle East’s influence on China in 
terms of terrorist threats and traditional se-
curity concerns. The strategic vacuum that 
the US has left leaves a lot of challenges and 
uncertainties for China. To respond to these 
challenges, China has initiated the One Belt 
and One Road (B&R) initiative to strengthen 
its economic, political and people-to-people 
ties with regional countries. At the same 
time, however, China’s military activity is still 
very hesitant and limited. Generally, China’s 
polices towards the Middle East are changing 
quietly, slowly, but sustainably. 
Traditional Chinese interests and policies 
in the Middle East
Typically, Chinese interests in the Middle 
East cover four areas. Political ties are the 
foundation, while economic and energy ties 
are playing a growing role in China’s relations 
with the region. 
Since the establishment of the PRC, China 
has maintained good political relationships 
with almost all of the countries in the Middle 
East. Comparing to its strong political ties, 
China’s economic, cultural and energy ties 
with the region were very weak during the 
Cold War. In China’s first important multina-
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tional show in 1954, the Bandung Conference, 
among the 29 members there were 14 from 
the Middle East, namely Egypt, Sudan, Libya, 
Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Tur-
key. Another representative from the region 
was the Mufti of Palestine. It is therefore very 
clear that the Middle East was crucial for the 
PRC’s rise politically in the international arena. 
China today has good relationships with al-
most all the countries in the region, and they 
are partners in many international issues. 
Clearly, the Middle East has been an import-
ant diplomatic asset for China for decades.
Energy security is China’s key concern cur-
rently in the region. China imports more oil 
from the Middle East than the other regions 
put together. In 2013, China imported 146.54 
million tons of oil from the Middle East, which 
was 52% of its overall imported oil. In 2014, 
China imported 53% of all imported oil from 
the greater Middle East (plus North African 
Arab countries, such as Egypt, Libya, and Al-
geria).1 Of the top 10 overseas oil suppliers of 
China, the Middle East has 6, which is Saudi 
Arabia (no.1), Oman (no. 3), Iraq (no. 5), Iran 
(no. 6), the United Arab Emirates (no. 9) and 
Kuwait (no. 10). 
Economic interests are a growing factor in 
China’s Middle East Policy. The Middle East 
is at a crossroads between three continents. 
The SLOCs through and surrounding the 
region are the key routes for world trade and 
communications. Trade via the Suez Canal 
represents 14% of total world trade. About 
20,000 vessels pass through the canal, 10% of 
which belong to China. Since 2011, Europe has 
become China’s biggest trade partner, with 
US$ 567.2 billion worth of trade, and 60% of 
Chinese exports to Europe pass through the 
Suez Canal. China-Africa trade is also worth 
over US$ 200 billion. The trade route between 
China and Africa also goes across the seas 
neighboring the Middle East. The Middle East 
is also an important market for Chinese goods 
and Chinese construction companies. In 2011, 
Chinese companies received construction 
contracts worth about US$21 billion from the 
Middle East. In 2012, trade between China and 
the GCC reached US$ 15.50 billion. In 2013, 
trade in energy, goods and services between 
China and the Middle East amounted to nearly 
US$ 300 billion. Arab countries are therefore 
key economic partners of China. In 2013, 
trade between China and the Arab countries 
reached US$ 240 billion. 
Geopolitical risk is a new concern for China. 
The Middle East is a part of China’s Greater 
Neighborhood. The Middle East is also the 
religious and cultural center of an Islamic belt 
stretching from North Africa, through the Mid-
dle Asia and South Asia, to Southeast Asia. 
This Islamic belt fringes the western and 
southwestern parts of China. The Middle East 
is also the future direction of China’s outward 
sea power. So what goes on in the Middle 
East not only influences China’s economic 
interests, it also has an impact on China’s 
security situation both abroad and at home. 
The role of the Middle East in China’s foreign 
policy has been greatly transformed, from a 
politics-driven model, to a politics-plus-energy 
model, to a current combination-driven model 
that incorporates political, energy, economic 
and strategic concerns. 
Partly thank to cautious policies and activ-
ities, China has a very good image in the 
Middle East. Almost all countries welcome 
China’s presence in the region. Just as the 
UAE ambassador to China, H.E. Omar Al 
Bitar, said in 2013, ‘the Middle East needs a 
fair arbitrator. This arbitrator should not have 
double standards and selfish intentions. Arab 
countries trust China because China is an 
affable and trustworthy country and also one 
permanent member in the UNSC.
New Challenges for China’s Middle East 
Policy
In recent years, many factors in the world 
and in the Middle East have changed. These 
will have an influence on China’s policies. 
1 CPCIA website, http://www.cpcia.org.cn/news/hyfx/ 
2015-1/144924.shtml, accessed 2015-10-22.
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The change in energy structure is a new fac-
tor for China. The Middle East is the biggest 
region of fossil energy resources, but due to 
explorations for shale gas, shale oil and other 
new energy sources, such as wind and solar, 
and progress in energy-conservation technol-
ogies, the significance of the Middle East in 
the world energy structure is also declining. 
The importance of the Middle East for China’ 
energy security will be also less significant 
in the future. That is, the turning point in 
Chinese energy consumption will be reached 
much earlier than expected. In the past, 
many analysts thought that this turning point 
would emerge around 2030, but according to 
China’s National Bureau of Statistics’ latest 
data, the country’s overall energy consump-
tion was 3.84 billion tons of standard coal in 
2014. This represents a decline in the annu-
al grow rate of 1.4 points compared to the 
previous year, the lowest growth rate during 
the past 16 years. China’s energy consump-
tion in 2015 was also less than expected. 
According to the CNPC’s report, China’s total 
energy consumption in 2015 was 4.24 billion 
tons of standard coal, an annual growth rate 
of -0.5%.2  China’s official data show 0.9% 
annual growth, just rising to 4.3 billion tons 
of standard coal in 2015,3 its lowest growth 
rate. Some analysts believe that ‘the turning 
point of China’s energy consumption will be 
reached around 2018’. After 2018, China’s 
energy consumption will fall.4 The likely earli-
er turning point is due to two main reasons: 
firstly, the slowing down of the Chinese econ-
omy, particularly in manufacturing and the 
infrastructure building sector; and secondly,  
the restructuring of the Chinese economy. 
The service sector, or tertiary industry, has 
been playing a more and more important role 
in the Chinese economy. All these factors 
have caused a change in China’s conception 
of its energy security. In the past, China was 
mainly concerned how and where it can ob-
tain oil. Today, it is more concerned about en-
ergy price and quality. China might therefore 
also rethink its policies on the Middle East, as 
energy may lose its status as a top priority in 
its diplomatic agenda in the region. 
Following the likely decline of the importance 
of energy, the security risk has become a 
growing factor in China’s Middle East poli-
cies. Terrorism, pirate attacks and religious 
factional conflicts are threatening not only 
the region, but also the rest of the world. 
Islamic State, AQAP, Somalia Shabab, Al Qae-
da in the Maghreb and many other radical 
movements and organizations are exploiting 
the chaos and conflicts in the region. Iraq 
and Syria are becoming the new center of an 
international terrorism campaign that im-
ports and exports large numbers of terrorists 
from and to other countries. Anti-China ter-
rorist organizations are also using the Mid-
dle East as a base from which to train and 
launch terrorist activities against China. In 
September 2015, the Turkistan Islamic Party 
(TIP, formerly as ETIM) issued a Uighur-lan-
guage video about its overall activities in 
northwestern Syria and its role in the recent 
fighting. The highlight is a feature about the 
‘little Jihadists’ who will ensure the future of 
the Uighur Jihad. According to reports, lots 
of Uighur people has reached the village of 
Al-Zenbaka, not far from the city of Jisr al 
Shughur, which has a population of about 
3,500. The presence of the TIP and other sig-
nificant terrorist organizations in Syria also 
has a strong impact on China’s relationship 
with relevant countries in the region. 
Geopolitical risk is another issue that China 
faces. Traditionally, the US is the primary ex-
ternal factor in the geostrategic structure in 
the Middle East, but following the reduction 
of America’s oil dependency on the Mid-
dle East, the intensity of its involvement in 
Middle Eastern issues is also declining. This 
change will cause lots of uncertainties in the 
region. China and other countries are looking 
2 2015年中国能源消费出现30年来首次负增长,                
http://futures.hexun.com/2016-01-26/182025675.html, 
accessed 2016-05-22. 
3 国家统计局  2015年中国能源消费同比增0.9%,               
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2016-02-29/doc-             
ifxpvutf3673351.shtml, accessed 2016-05-22. 
4 去年中国能源消费增速创16年新低 2018年现拐点, 
http://money.163.com/15/0211/05/AI59CT3P00253B0H.
html
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hard to find a perfect option to fill this stra-
tegic vacuum. There is a dilemma involved 
for China and otherworld powers: the US is 
declining in its desire and ability to handle 
the Middle East situation, but if other pow-
ers came in, the US would view it as fresh 
strategic competition and even as a brick 
in a greater strategic game. To avoid giving 
itself the image of a strategic competitor in 
the Middle East, China restrains itself from 
becoming involved more assertively and is 
instead focusing on economic and political 
cooperation with the regional powers.
China’s changing identity is another factor. 
In the past, China’s national interests were 
narrow and limited, greatly simplifying its 
foreign policy in the region. Following the rise 
of China, China’s national interests have ex-
panded to every corner of the world and every 
arena. These multi-faceted national interests 
are forcing China to rebalance its relations 
with the Middle East and revamp its own 
international image and status. For example, 
China voted in favor of UNSC resolution 1929 
against the Iranian nuclear program, about 
which Iran was very angry. In 2012, China’s 
then vice-minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Zai 
Jun, visited Syria, meeting the Syrian pres-
ident and leaders of the opposition on the 
same visit. Even as China has tried its best 
to keep a balanced posture, many countries 
have criticized China’s policy as supporting 
one side of the conflict in Syria. More im-
portantly, in the past, China’s identity as a 
developing country allowed it to talk to many 
countries in the Middle East. But today, in 
many countries’ eyes, China is now a devel-
oped country. The economic gap is therefore 
creating a widening gap in attitudes between 
China and some countries in the Middle East. 
China’s New Approaches to the Middle East
Traditionally, China’s policies toward the 
Middle East were based on the principles of 
sovereignty, equality and non-interference in 
internal affairs. The main feature of Chinese 
foreign policy in the region is to maintain a 
neutral stance in all confrontations and con-
flicts, but this tradition will be hard for China 
to follow in the new situation. China needs a 
more proactive policy, despite its hesitancy 
and caution. In the process of rebalancing 
its rising capacity and typical self-restrained 
foreign policy, China is taking some new 
initiatives. 
 
China has elevated the status of Middle East-
ern states within its whole diplomatic archi-
tecture. In October 2013, the Chinese central 
government held a high-ranking conference 
specifically on neighborhood diplomacy, and 
in November 2014, China declared that the 
neighborhood states are strategically signifi-
cant for its development and the international 
environment. Through these statements, Chi-
na has changed the priority list of its diplo-
macy and has raised neighborhood countries 
to a similar high level with world powers. The 
Middle East is also a part of China’s Greater 
Neighborhood. 
The B&R initiative is the most ambitious 
initiative in China’s diplomatic history. Even 
though energy ties between China and the 
Middle East may have been reduced tempo-
rarily, OBOR will increase the significance of 
the Middle East in China’s strategic outlines. 
In the framework of a ’21st Century Maritime 
Silk Road’, the Middle East is the key node 
between three continents and also an im-
portant part of mutual communications and 
mutual linkages. In November 2014, the Qa-
tari emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, 
said that the OBOR will provide important 
opportunities for China-Qatar cooperation 
in energy and infrastructure development. 
In December 2014, Egyptian president Sissi 
also hailed B&R and argued that it would 
revive the great ancient Silk Road between 
East and West. 
People-to-people exchange and cultural di-
plomacy are new approaches for China in the 
Middle East. In order to promote China-Arab 
relations, both sides decided to declare 2014 
and 2015 ‘China-Arab Friendship Years’ and 
to host many exchange events. China will 
train 6000 experts and professionals for Arab 
26 China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report
countries within three years and organize 
10,000 artists from both sides to visit each 
other and to establish and support more than 
200 China-Arab cultural institutes. In 2016, 
China, Egypt and Qatar will host different 
culture-year events respectively.
China will pay greater attention to security 
and political issues in the Middle East. In the 
past, China did not have a clear Middle East 
strategy or policy, particularly in the security 
sector. But since the anti-piracy operations 
off Somalia’s coast, China has pursued a soft 
military presence in the Middle East. This is a 
notable change in China’s foreign policy. 
Short Conclusion
Generally, China needs a new conceptual 
framework for its policy on the Middle East. 
Following its rise, China has more and more 
complicated interests in the Middle East, 
while many regional countries also anticipate 
that China should do more, and more active 
in the region. Partly as s respond to these 
calls, China has transformed itself from a 
neutral outsider to a strategic participant. 
However, in the foreseeable future, China 
will not serve as another strategic stabilizer 
like the US has done for decades due to its 
limited capacity and self-effacing traditional 
culture. 
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CHINA’S MIDDLE EAST CONUNDRUM 
AND PROSPECTS FOR COLLECTIVE 
SECURITY 
N. Janardhan
Introduction
Few would dispute that there is a global 
foreign policy crisis – China’s and Russia’s 
anti-west foreign policies are more confronta-
tional than constructive; Turkey’s ‘zero prob-
lem’ foreign policy is witnessing an awful lot 
of problems;1 India’s ‘play it safe’ approach is 
indeed safe, but non-purposeful from a global 
1 Turkish academic-turned-foreign minister-turned-prime 
minister Ahmed Davutoglu devised the ‘zero problems 
with neighbours’ doctrine in 2004 to overcome Ankara’s 
disputes in the region. This was also meant to enhance 
relations among the regional states in the Middle East. 
However, a combination of Turkish foreign policy and 
events on the ground has left it with more problems than 
it started with a little more than a decade ago.
2 N. Janardhan, ‘America’s policy crisis,’ Khaleej Times 
(UAE), 23 April 2012.
perspective; the United States’ ‘poke your 
thumb at others’ noses’, while its own is bleed-
ing, is a lesson in what foreign policy ought 
not be; in following the United States on most 
issues, much of Europe has no independent 
foreign policy; and the less said the better 
about the foreign policies of the Middle East 
countries, which are either with or against the 
United States and the rest of the west.
The question that arises while pondering 
over these realities is – what drives foreign 
policy? At least four Ps come to mind – prin-
ciple, profit, power projection and prestige. 
From the Middle East perspective, how the 
principal security guarantor – the United 
States – has fared on each of these factors 
explains its failures during the last decade, 
making us wonder about future alternatives.2
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Adding another dimension to these crises 
is the Arab uprisings, which have been 
compared to the 1979 Islamic Revolution 
in Iran, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991 and the 9/11 attacks in 2001, which 
impacted the political-security equations 
in the Middle East, and which have led 
to geopolitical changes and ideological 
rivalries to fill the power vacuum in the 
region.3 
It is ironical that the Arab uprising, which 
began as an attempt to seek political free-
dom as a way of mending economic depri-
vation, has achieved neither. Instead, it ap-
pears that Mohamed Bouazizi did not just 
set himself alight in Tunisia four years ago; 
the flames from his self-immolation have 
set the entire region ablaze, triggering an 
international power struggle between and 
among both nations and non-state actors, 
thereby sending the global balance of pow-
er into a spin. There are strong indications 
that a transformation of the international 
order, currently consisting of a unipolar 
world, is either in progress or would follow 
as a result. 
The Arab uprisings
This evaluation is conditioned by the assess-
ment that the Arab uprisings have reinforced 
the regional approach over the international 
approach. It is understood that most of the 
regional crises were triggered by the adop-
tion of Western solutions, including the use 
of force. This has hastened the development 
of regional perspectives in resolving regional 
issues, which, in the context of the Gulf Co-
operation Council (GCC) countries, especially 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, could be traced back 
about a decade. 
In the present scenario, far from international 
affairs affecting the region’s politics, it was 
the events following the Arab uprisings that 
3 Kayhan Barzegar, ‘A turning point in the Middle East geo-
politics,’ Global Affairs (Russia), 24 June 2012.
influenced international affairs.4 One of the 
most significant fall-outs of the uprisings 
was the reversal of rapprochement efforts 
on several fronts – GCC–Iran, GCC–Syria, 
Syria–west. Suddenly most of these efforts 
hit roadblocks in 2011, and the very actors 
involved in the rapprochement were and are 
still at loggerheads.
After largely being ‘neutral’ mediators, Arab 
countries began to take sides, supplied funds 
and arms to opposing factions, and even 
ventured into direct military action in Syria, 
Libya and Yemen. 
The GCC stand on the Syrian crisis, in partic-
ular, became one of the factors that widened 
the Sunni–Shiite divisions in the region, inten-
sifying Saudi–Iranian rivalry. The hostility be-
tween the two countries and the sects they 
represent became more pronounced than 
it was in 2011, thereby worsening regional 
sectarian divisions and insecurity. Nothing 
demonstrates this better than the gains of 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
Further, non-state actors have become 
greater enemies than states – Osama bin 
Laden may be dead, but the emergence of 
more radicalized outfits like ISIS has become 
evident across the region. 
While these developments could be attributed 
to the decline of influence of great powers 
like the United States and Russia (until its 
dramatic intervention and pullback in Syria) 
in the Middle East, it is also leading to some 
sort of rapprochement between and among 
them. The warring United States and the 
Russia–China duo created a cooperative re-
lationship to reach a deal on Iran, which may 
be repeated, along with the GCC countries, 
in the search for a political solution in Syria.5 
4 Mohammad Sayed Rassas, ‘How the Arab Spring altered 
the region and the world,’ www.almonitor.com, 4 October 
2012. 
5 Daniel Levy and Julien Barnes-Dacey, ‘Syria: the impera-
tive of de-escalation,’ www.opendemocracy.net, 25 May 
2013.
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This may eventually facilitate GCC–Iran dia-
logue at some point in the future.6 In fact, in 
September 2015, Qatar said it was willing to 
facilitate such a dialogue.7
Linking these developments to China re-
quires an assessment of their impact on the 
United States – the “superbroke, superfrugal 
superpower”.8 
The Arab uprisings have hastened the 
decline of US influence in a region that was 
already witnessing US fatigue with the re-
gion and the region’s fatigue with the United 
States. The fatigue on both sides has been 
greatly influenced by the Obama administra-
tion’s efforts to correct the military adven-
tures of the George W. Bush administration, 
which affected the US domestic economy, 
thereby necessitating defence budget cuts 
and the ‘pivot’ to Asia. 
The 2014 pronouncement that, ‘just because 
we have the best hammer (military) does not 
mean that every problem is a nail,’ is an im-
portant admission in Obama’s continued at-
tempt to refashion American foreign policy.9
The only reason that most Middle East 
countries are still holding on to the Unit-
ed States is due to its security cover in a 
region that equates ‘national’ security with 
‘regime’ security. In the event that there is 
likely to be a credible alternative, even in the 
distant future, American influence is bound 
to diminish enormously.
6 Though both are Islamic countries, they have histori-
cally been divided along sectarian lines, i.e. Sunni Saudi 
Arabia versus Shiite Iran. This ideological division, exac-
erbated by the 1979 revolution in Iran, has had profound 
political implications, influencing politics involving Bah-
rain, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and even the United 
States, among others. At the root of it is the ‘unfought’ 
war for leadership of the region and the Muslim world, in 
that order. 
7 ‘Qatar offers to host Arab dialogue with Iran,’ www.alja-
zeera.com, 29 September 2015.
8 Thomas Friedman, ‘Superbroke, Superfrugal, Superpow-
er?’ The New York Times, 4 September 2010.
9 Part of President Obama’s speech at a US military acad-
emy in May 2014.
10 For more on the security dynamics of Gulf–Asia rela-
tions, see N. Janardhan, Boom amid Gloom: The Spirit of 
Possibility in 21st Century Gulf (Ithaca, 2011).
11 Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani said this 
at the General Debate of the United National General As-
sembly in September 2007.
12 Nawaf Obaid, ‘Saudi Arabia gets tough on foreign policy,’ 
Washington Post, October 25, 2013. Recent developments 
in Bahrain, Syria and Yemen – where Saudi Arabia 
worked on its own, even if it contradicted the United 
States – proves that such statements are not mere rhet-
oric. 
13 Christian Koch, ‘Gulf region makes strategic shift in 
new global system,’ Arab News, 22 October 2006; and 
‘Gulf needs more, not less, external involvement,’ www.
gulfinthemedia.com, 27 January 2006.
In this context, it is important to cast light on 
the security debate of the Middle East during 
the last fifteen years, which has revolved 
around two points of view: one, less interna-
tional involvement in the region’s affairs; and 
two, greater internationalization of the region. 
Omni-balancing
Since the dominant view favours the second 
option, there have been calls to explore the 
idea of incorporating several international 
actors who could act as guarantors of any 
future regional security arrangement. Some 
Gulf leaders and intellectuals have issued 
statements in support of this idea.10 Some 
examples include: ‘The major conflicts in the 
world have become too big for one single 
power to handle them on its own’ (Qatar);11 
and ‘It is clear that the Saudis fully intend to 
pursue their national security interests much 
more assertively, even if that leads to a strategic 
break with the United States’ (Saudi analyst 
Nawaf Obaid).12
It is this ‘failure of others’ in dealing with 
regional issues that has both reinforced the 
wisdom of exploring local solutions for local 
problems, as well as encouraging a ‘real 
strategic shift’ in the region’s foreign policy. 
Owing to the failure of the United States in 
the region and the shift in the economic pow-
er center from west to east, the GCC states 
began building ties with a host of alterna-
tives, particularly in Asia.13 
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Thus, rather than put all their eggs in one 
basket, this ‘omni-balancing’ means that the 
region’s ties with the United States are no 
longer exclusive.14
It is in this context that some Asian scholars 
have been pushing the idea of upgrading 
the GCC–Asia buyer–seller relationship to 
a strategic one. They are also exploring the 
possibilities for a new collective security 
architecture, which would involve both Asian 
and western powers, including the United 
States.15 
The point is that Asian powers will have to 
stop riding piggyback on the US naval pres-
ence in the region’s waters at some point and 
start finding their own means of securing 
their sea lanes. Assuming that America’s 
involvement in the region will progressively 
diminish in the decades ahead, this opens 
up interesting possibilities by diversifying the 
number of security players catering to the 
region’s security and stability.
The China link
It is now easy to link this to China and its 
Middle East conundrum: strong, benevolent 
power (wang dao) or strong, interventionist 
power (bao dao)? This has been, is and will 
continue to be China’s predicament not only 
in the region, but in the global context too. 
Unlike China’s ties with Africa, which are seen 
as ‘resource imperialism’, Beijing’s interest 
in West Asia is referred to as a ‘joining of 
equals’. Starting with the ‘exchange of Arab 
oil for Chinese capital’, it has developed into 
a web of two-way economic deals during the 
last decade and a half.16 
14 Concept propounded by Steven David of Johns Hopkins 
University.
15 Ranjit Gupta, N. Janardhan, et al., A New Gulf Security 
Architecture: Prospects and Challenges for an Asian Role 
(Gerlach 2014).
16 Stephen Glain, ‘The Modern Silk Road,’ Newsweek, 17 
May 2008.
17 John Gittings, cited in Julian Madsen, ‘China Makes 
Friends in the Gulf,’ www.asiasentinel.com, 30 October 
2006.
18 Edward Cody, ‘China Offers Glimpse of Rationale Behind 
its Military Policies,’ Washington Post, 30 December 2006; 
for more details of the Chinese navy’s modernisation 
plan, see Bernard D. Cole, ‘The PLA Navy’s Developing 
Strategy,’ China Brief, Jamestown Foundation (Washing-
ton), 25 October 2006; and ‘China puts on huge show of 
force at parade, to cut troop levels by 300,000,’ Agence 
France-Presse, 3 September 2015.
19 The Economist, 7 April 2012.
In the realm of international politics, however, 
Beijing is considered a ‘status quo power that 
often punches below its weight’.17 Nonethe-
less it is its energy security issue and global 
ambitions that keep it interested in West 
Asia’s big game. 
The prospect of a Chinese role in the re-
gion also arises because of its ties on the 
opposite sides of the political spectrum – 
with both Iran and Israel, as well as Saudi 
Arabia and the Palestinians. Further, as 
the water-bound trade picks up steam in 
the years ahead, China will naturally seek 
to protect its economic interests in the 
region’s waters, which overlaps with the 
region’s security interests. The fact that 
this would occur in a milieu of declining 
US military interest and political influence 
makes it more interesting. (The economic, 
political and security factors mentioned 
here are also applicable to India’s West 
Asia policy in future). 
The Chinese views on regional security are 
mentioned in government documents. Mili-
tary improvements are part of the country’s 
overall modernization and economic expan-
sion. It sought to ‘lay a solid foundation’ by 
2010, make ‘major progress’ by the end of 
2020, and ‘reach the strategic goal of build-
ing informationized armed forces and being 
capable of winning informationized wars by 
2050’.18 
This possibility is in sync with some predic-
tions that the Chinese defence budget will 
surpass that of the United States by 2036.19 
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This also means that with power comes 
responsibility.
Extending its strategy to the West Asia re-
gion, China is increasing its multi-layered en-
gagement. Beijing is already looking beyond 
the protection net provided by the United 
States, diversifying its energy suppliers, as 
well as developing new supply routes and 
port facilities through which it can import 
oil. Economically, China has offered billions 
of dollars in aid and loan guarantees to build 
its ‘String of Pearls’ at the Pakistani port of 
Gwadar, which is on the doorsteps of the Gulf 
and the Strait of Hormuz.20 
It also announced the ‘One Belt, One Road’ 
initiative in 2013, which focuses on con-
nectivity and cooperation among countries 
primarily in Eurasia, including the West Asian 
countries. Reviving the Silk Road project, an 
ancient trade route linking China to Persia 
and the Arab world, this initiative has two 
components – the land-based ‘Silk Road 
Economic Belt’, and the oceangoing ‘Mari-
time Silk Road’. While these strategies are pri-
marily economic in nature, they also under-
line China’s desire to take on a greater role in 
global affairs.
Politically and strategically, the menace of 
Somali pirates hastened the involvement of 
the Chinese navy in the region’s waters a few 
years ago. Beijing’s signal in 2008 in sending 
warships to deal with it was seen as China’s 
‘biggest naval expedition since the 15th 
century’.21
In late 2012, China rolled out a ‘Four-Point 
Plan’ for Syria that called on all sides to stop 
fighting, end the crisis and initiate a political 
transition, but it generated little international 
interest. And in March 2015, Beijing sent war-
ships to rescue Chinese nationals from Ye-
men.22 Further, Beijing is also worried about 
extremist elements in West Asia providing 
training and inspiration for Muslim separat-
ists in its western Xinjiang province.
While these examples indicate that China 
is quite active in the region, the problem is 
that ‘Beijing does not want to choose sides 
in a region that regularly demands it.’23 In 
the current context, this is a prudent policy 
– one that was acknowledged even by US 
President Barack Obama earlier this year – 
China is a ‘free rider…can’t the United States 
be a little bit more like China?’24
Beijing has long espoused a policy of 
‘non-interference’ in other countries’ inter-
nal affairs. It opposed the American-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 and voted with 
Russia to block action to end Bashar Al 
Assad’s rule in Syria. It is not taking part in 
the coalition of sixty-odd countries fight-
ing ISIS, despite its oil interests in Iraq and 
unsubstantiated reports of three hundred 
Chinese Muslims fighting there. 
While Beijing committed combat troops to 
Mali in 2013 and has more personnel in blue 
helmets in Africa than any other permanent 
member of the Security Council, it is a re-
luctant actor in West Asia. This is because it 
feels it still does not have the ‘ability’ to lead 
in resolving current conflicts in the region.
In any case, why should it invest in clearing up 
the mess that the West has created? Further, 
China still has plenty of domestic issues to 
address. Given its vast population, it is still a 
long way from achieving prosperity across the 
board, which is the key to its political stability. 
Taking no risk is sometimes the biggest risk, 
and China is being adventurous in inaction. 
20 China becomes increasingly involved in the Middle East,’ 
PINR, 10 March 2006.
21 ‘China sends naval fleet to Somalia to battle pirates,’ The 
Guardian, 18 December 2008.
22 Ilan Goldenberg and Ely Ratner, ‘China’s Middle East 
Tightrope,’ Foreign Policy, 20 April 2015.
23 Ibid.
24 Thomas Friedman, ‘Obama on the world,’ The New York 
Times, 8 August 2014.
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The recent economic slowdown will encour-
age conservatism over adventurism. China 
surely has learnt from America’s misadven-
tures in West Asia, where Washington has 
earned itself more enemies than friends 
over the last few decades.
Yet, Beijing released a first of its kind ‘Arab 
Policy Paper on China’ in January 2016. This 
sets out the country’s development strat-
egies with Arab countries and mirrors its 
readiness to cooperate with them and to tap 
each other’s strengths to ensure a win-win 
situation. More importantly, it reiterates its 
political commitment to peace and stability 
in the Middle East, which is mutually benefi-
cial.25
Within days of releasing this paper, President 
Xi Jinping made his first tour of the Middle 
East since assuming office. By visiting Saudi 
Arabia, Iran and Egypt, especially during the 
height of the Riyadh–Tehran feud, Beijing 
clearly demonstrated that the region is very 
much a part its strategic focus, perhaps ex-
tending beyond business interests.26 
While China is playing a calculated wait-and-
watch game in a region torn apart by turmoil, 
Washington is worried about Beijing’s moves 
elsewhere in the world, thereby intensifying 
their overall strategic competition.
Conclusion
From a wider perspective, the pursuit of prin-
ciple, profit, power projection and prestige by 
various actors through their foreign policies 
is transforming Middle Eastern politics, carry-
ing the potential to alter the current geopoliti-
cal situation based on a unipolar world. 
Whether or not China is interested in the 
region, the United States is worried about 
Chinese inroads into the Middle East. It is im-
portant to note that, while Washington would 
desire ‘a unipolar world and a multipolar Asia, 
China would prefer a multipolar world and a 
China-centric unipolar Asia’. How the United 
States will reconcile itself with a new world 
characterized by an emergent China – one 
that is not ‘anti-US, but that approaches it as 
if it were a post-US world’ – is crucial.27
25 Details of the policy paper are available at China’s Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs website:  http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1331683.shtml 
26 For more on this issue, see ‘Well wishing,’ The Economist, 
23 January 2016. 
27 Fareed Zakaria, ‘The future of American power: how 
America can survive the rise of the rest,’ Foreign Affairs 
(May/June 2008).
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CHINA IN SEARCH OF ‘LEGITIMATE’ 
GREAT-POWER INTERVENTION
Camilla Sørensen
Introduction
Thanks to Beijing’s expanding global role and 
interests, it is no longer possible for China 
to follow its traditional ‘lay low’ [tao guang 
yang hui] strategy and the traditionally rather 
strict interpretation of the principle of non-in-
tervention. Consequently, among Chinese 
International Relations (IR) scholars there is 
an intense debate on how China can protect 
and promote its global presence and interests 
while at the same time continuing to ‘stay 
within’ the principle of non-intervention. New 
concepts and approaches are developing as 
the debate progresses. One important exam-
ple is the growing emphasis on the distinction 
between ‘intervention’ [ganyu] and ‘interfer-
ence’ [ganshe] in China’s diplomatic rhetoric 
and toolbox. Several Chinese IR scholars 
hence stress that, while ‘non-intervention’ 
continues to characterize the Chinese for-
eign and security policy approach, Beijing 
has started to interfere in developments and 
conflicts in other states and in the interna-
tional system to a greater degree and also 
more proactively. Current Chinese foreign 
and security policy reflects a more flexible 
and pragmatic Chinese interpretation – and 
implementation – of the principle of non-in-
tervention. This paper examines the search 
for ‘legitimate’ great-power intervention that 
characterizes both the debate among Chi-
nese IR scholars and current Chinese foreign 
and security policy.  
The paper proceeds in four main stages. 
First, it sets the scene by briefly outlining the 
ongoing developments in and the challenges 
facing Chinese foreign and security policy. 
Secondly, it provides a critical overview of 
the debate among Chinese IR scholars about 
whether and how to rethink and reform Chi-
na’s key traditional foreign and security policy 
guidelines. Thirdly, it examines China’s more 
flexible and pragmatic interpretation and 
implementation of the principle of non-in-
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tervention. In the fourth and last section of 
the paper the concluding perspectives are 
presented and discussed. The paper draws 
on interviews with Chinese IR scholars con-
ducted by the author in Beijing and Shanghai 
in February-April 2014 and October 2015.
Chinese foreign and security policy in 
its changing domestic and international 
contexts
The point of departure for this paper is 
two important questions about the further 
development of Chinese foreign and secu-
rity policy. The first of these questions is, 
how will China’s foreign and security policy 
change as its role, interests and capabilities 
increase and become more global? In recent 
years China’s foreign and security policy has 
evolved in a contradictory manner, with signs 
of a more assertive, even aggressive, policy 
on the one hand and of a more cooperative 
and constructive, even responsible, policy 
on the other (Sørensen, 2015: 65-69). This 
provides the context for the second question, 
which is, what policies have the greatest and 
least likelihood of continuity in the years and 
decades to come? These are broad ques-
tions, and therefore the focus below is on 
one aspect of Chinese foreign and security 
policy, where the implications of Beijing’s 
expanding global role, interests and capabili-
ties are directly visible, as well as difficult for 
the Chinese leadership to deal with, namely 
China’s adherence to the principle of non-in-
tervention, which is one of its key tradition-
al foreign and security policy guidelines.1 
However, it was crafted in a different interna-
tional environment in which China had few 
economic and security interests to protect 
outside its own borders (Duchatel, Brauner 
and Zhou, 2014: 1-4).
1 The principles of non-intervention [bu ganyu] and non-in-
terference [bu ganshe] are often used interchangeably by 
Chinese International Relations scholars and in official 
Chinese documents. As discussed further below, how-
ever, it seems that a clearer distinction between these 
principles has been emerging recently, as well as greater 
clarity in their usage. 
China’s globally expanding role and interests 
are being driven in particular by its growing 
need for imports of energy and raw materi-
als in order to maintain domestic economic 
growth and stability, which continues to be 
the top priority for Chinese leaders. However, 
China’s globally expanding role and interests 
make it impossible to comply with the tradi-
tional ‘lay low’ [tao guang yang hui] strategy 
and the traditional rather strict interpretation 
of the principle of non-intervention. Increas-
ingly Beijing has its own strong stakes in how 
domestic politics in other states develop and 
how international conflicts and crises are 
managed and resolved (Godement, 2013). 
The pressure on the traditional ‘lay low’ 
strategy also arises from strong concerns in 
Beijing about living up to growing domestic 
expectations of how Chinese leaders should 
more actively and directly protect and pro-
mote Chinese nationals, investments and 
activities abroad and in the process show a 
willingness to demonstrate or even use Chi-
na’s strengthened economic and military ca-
pabilities. This relates to growing domestic 
demands to (re)gain international status and 
respect for China as a great power. Strong 
nationalist voices, in particular expressed 
online, are spurring such expectations and 
demands (Wang and Wang, 2014). The 
Chinese military, the PLA, has also increased 
the pressure on Chinese leaders to seize op-
portunities to try out China’s now improved 
power-projection capabilities, as seen in the 
evacuation of Chinese nationals from Ye-
men in early April 2015 (Duchatel, Brauner 
and Zhou, 2014: 15; Panda, 2015).2 Hence, 
domestic politics play into this as well 
with the important point here being that, 
in their efforts to deliver, Chinese leaders 
will most likely effectively end the tradi-
tional Chinese policy of non-intervention. 
2 The 2013 Chinese Defense White Paper for the first time 
underlined the protection of overseas energy resourc-
es and Chinese nationals overseas as major security 
concerns and as tasks for the Chinese military; cf. ‘The 
Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces’, Bei-
jing: Information Office of the State Council, April 2013.
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With respect to the dimension of domestic 
politics, several Chinese IR scholars argue 
that Beijing is no longer so concerned 
about other states intervening in China, for 
example, because of Tibet or Taiwan. Chi-
na earlier insisted on the principle as a way 
of self-protection as well, which today, with 
the development of a stronger and more 
self-confident China, no longer appears to 
be such a big concern (cf. also Duchatel, 
Brauner and Zhou, 2014: 7-8). 
Finally, the traditional ‘lay low’ strategy 
is challenged by the fact that China can 
no longer free-ride on the US role as ‘the 
global policeman’ guaranteeing internation-
al stability and other international public 
goods: the US is no longer willing or able 
to do all the hard work in, for example, the 
Middle East to the same degree. As a con-
sequence, international expectations and 
demands are growing on China to assume 
greater responsibilities and play a more 
active role in managing and solving interna-
tional conflicts and crises – to be ‘a respon-
sible stakeholder’, in other words (Wang, 
2011). In this respect, it is interesting to see 
several Chinese IR scholars stressing how 
much Beijing fears the US reducing its pres-
ence in the Middle East, rather than seeing 
this as a strategic opportunity for itself (cf. 
also Godement, 2013). 
The important point here is that these in-
ternational and domestic expectations and 
demands, which are challenging the tradi-
tional ‘lay low’ strategy and the traditionally 
rather strict interpretation of the principle of 
non-intervention, are not leading to or pro-
moting the same developments in Chinese 
foreign and security policy; rather, they are 
pulling in different directions. 
Rethinking and reforming China’s key 
traditional foreign and security policy 
guidelines: the debate
Among Chinese IR scholars, there is an 
intense debate on how China can protect 
and promote China’s global presence and 
interests while at the same time continuing 
to respect the principle of non-intervention; 
that is, how China can intervene – or inter-
fere – in a ‘legitimate’ way. This debate on 
intervention/non-intervention is closely re-
lated to the ongoing debate among Chinese 
IR scholars on the ‘lay low’ strategy (cf. e.g. 
Zhu, 2010). 
Chinese IR scholars participating in the 
debate on intervention/non-intervention 
tend to express the same frustrations on 
widely different issues and examples. A 
broad consensus seems to be developing 
about the need to rethink and reform – few 
say ‘give up’ – the principle of non-inter-
vention and develop a Chinese approach of 
‘limited intervention’ [youxian ganshe] and 
‘creative involvement’ [chuangzaoxing jieru] 
that could serve Beijing’s expanding glob-
al role and interests better (cf. e.g. Wang, 
2012). However, most Chinese IR scholars 
also acknowledge that adopting such an 
approach and a policy that is not afraid to 
take sides and that favors particular domes-
tic outcomes in other states is also very 
complicated and opens up a whole array of 
new challenges (cf. Godement, 2013: 1-2). A 
key concern driving this debate is therefore 
how to become more actively and construc-
tively involved in international affairs on the 
one hand and better protect and promote 
Chinese global interests on the other hand, 
while at the same time continuing to respect 
the principle of non-intervention and not end 
up conducting foreign and security policy 
like the ‘hegemon’ (that is, the US) and risk 
creating greater instability and chaos in the 
international system. This is not an easy 
puzzle to solve. Added to the complexity is 
the key Chinese argument – or insistence – 
that China is a different kind of great power 
than the US/the west that does not inter-
vene militarily or overthrow other regimes 
in order to protect and promote its own 
narrow interests. This relates to the Chinese 
distinction between the kingly way (‘rule by 
virtue’) [wang dao] and the tyrant way (‘rule 
by force’) [ba dao], which is central to the 
Chinese debate and China’s perception of it-
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self as a great power; China, of course, acts 
in the kingly way (cf. Zhu, 2010: 23-26). 
One group of Chinese IR scholars, in em-
phasizing the importance of China being 
‘a responsible great power’ [fuzeren daguo] 
with a positive international image, tends to 
promote stronger Chinese cooperation with 
other great powers and a more active Chi-
nese role in both international and regional 
multilateral organizations. However, another 
group of Chinese IR scholars emphasizes 
the importance of advancing and protecting 
China’s globally expanding role and interests. 
It therefore argues that China should become 
more active in using its growing economic 
and military capabilities abroad to promote a 
more active, but also strongly unilateral, Chi-
nese foreign and security policy. As a result, 
China’s different balancing games, as in the 
Middle East, where Beijing generally tries to 
maintain friendly relations with everyone, are 
seen as ineffectual. China therefore needs 
to choose and take a stand more clearly, 
with a focus on protecting and promoting its 
own interests (cf. Godement, 2013). Related 
to this argument, some scholars, like Prof. 
Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University, further 
argue that it is necessary for China to get rid 
of its principle of non-alignment entirely (Yan, 
2012). 
The debate among Chinese IR scholars 
provides an important window in identifying 
and understanding emerging trends in the 
evolving Chinese foreign and security policy. 
However, before discussing the criteria for 
‘legitimate’ great-power intervention that are 
often highlighted by these scholars, it is use-
ful to examine briefly China’s current foreign 
and security policy.
Rethinking and reforming China’s key 
traditional foreign and security policy 
guidelines: the policy 
The development of Chinese foreign and 
security policy in recent years reflects a more 
flexible and pragmatic Chinese interpreta-
tion and implementation of the principle of 
non-intervention. China has become more 
deeply and more proactively involved in the 
politics of other regions, for example, in the 
politics of the Middle East and of Africa, 
and Beijing is also seeking to shape political 
developments in other states to a greater 
degree (cf. e.g. Wang, 2012). In relation to 
several international conflicts and crises, 
Chinese leaders have presented diplomatic 
suggestions and offered to play a mediating 
role, for example, in relation to Sudan and 
Afghanistan. Furthermore, Beijing has been 
seeking to play a more active and construc-
tive international role by strengthening bilat-
eral and multilateral cooperation with other 
great and emerging powers and regional 
organizations, for example, in relation to Iran 
and the Iranian nuclear crisis. 
China’s commitment to and involvement in 
UN peacekeeping has also been deepened 
further. In September 2015 the Chinese 
President, Xi Jinping, gave a speech at the 
general debate of the 70th session of the UN 
General Assembly, announcing that China 
will join the new UN peacekeeping capa-
bility readiness system, and even take the 
lead in setting up a permanent UN peace-
keeping police unit, itself establishing a 
strong standby peacekeeping force of 8,000 
troops. Xi Jinping further reported that Chi-
na will establish a ten-year, $1 billion China–
UN peace and development fund ‘to support 
the UN’s work and promote the multilateral 
cooperation cause’ (Adler and Sidiropoulos, 
2015; Xi, 2015). And lastly, indicating the 
growing Chinese emphasis on the impor-
tance and role of regional organizations, Xi 
Jinping announced that Beijing will provide 
$100 million of free military assistance to 
the African Union in the next five years to 
support the establishment of the long-await-
ed ‘African Standby Force’ and the ‘African 
Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis’ 
(ACIRC) (ibid.). 
As a result, during his five-day African tour in 
early December 2015, Xi Jinping announced 
a Chinese plan to build a logistics facility for 
its navy in the East African state of Djibouti. 
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This was presented as a logical next step 
in China’s growing willingness to act as a 
protector and provider of regional security 
and development, specifically referring to the 
Chinese role in UN peacekeeping operations 
in Africa and in the anti-piracy operations off 
the Somali coast (Page and Lubold, 2015). 
China clearly also has its own narrow inter-
ests in establishing what is likely to become 
its first overseas military base. No matter 
whether this is called a military base or not, it 
represents a clear departure from the tradi-
tional rather strict interpretation of the princi-
ple of non-intervention and the long-held Chi-
nese position that China – in contrast to the 
US and other western great powers – does 
not want to deploy its military on a long-term 
basis overseas.
There are also signs of a kind of Chinese 
‘stick and carrot’ diplomacy, where Beijing 
has started to show increased willingness 
to use its now stronger economic and 
military strength to influence the domestic 
politics of other states and to protect and 
promote Chinese national economic and 
political interests, as shown by China’s use 
of commercial diplomacy in its relations 
with several East Asian states (Reilly, 2012). 
With respect to the maritime territorial 
disputes in East Asia, Chinese leaders have 
also increasingly used coercive diplomacy 
and military means (Sutter, 2015: 110-112). 
Lastly, there are cases where Beijing con-
tinues to insist on the strict interpretation 
of the principle of non-intervention, as in 
relation to Syria. The ‘lesson of Libya’ and 
the general Chinese suspicion of western, 
especially US, motives for intervention are 
often included in China’s arguments for the 
importance of upholding the strict interpre-
tation of the principle of non-intervention in 
general and for the Chinese position on the 
Syrian conflict specifically (cf. Ren, 2014; 
Jiang, 2015). The more specific Chinese 
concern here is that the US could use the 
‘responsibility to protect’ [baohu de zeren] 
as an excuse to turn regime change into a 
new norm in international relations (cf. e.g. 
Godement, 2013). 
To sum up: China has gradually developed a 
prudent and pragmatic case-by-case ap-
proach, which underlines the extent to which 
its position and policies on non-intervention, 
territorial integrity and sovereignty are condi-
tional. This in itself is not new – the principle 
of non-intervention is a key guideline in Chi-
na’s diplomatic work and a major rhetorical 
tool, whereas there has always been a degree 
of flexibility in how China actually conducts 
its foreign and security policy when it comes 
to non-intervention. The important point 
here, however, is that the context and condi-
tions are changing, as are Chinese interests 
and instruments. Beijing now has a stronger 
role and greater influence in the international 
system, as well as greater economic, political 
and military power to deploy, and this has 
clearly changed the importance and implica-
tions of the Chinese intervention or non-inter-
vention. Also, there are, as discussed above, 
growing expectations and pressures, both 
domestically and internationally, on Beijing 
to engage and interfere proactively and not 
maintain the more passive and reactive ways 
of the past. 
Great power intervention with Chinese 
characteristics in both debate and policy 
As highlighted above, Chinese adherence to 
the principle of non-intervention is not synon-
ymous with Chinese inaction, and the debate 
among Chinese IR scholars and China’s cur-
rent foreign and security policy both provide 
clues about its evolving ‘management’ of the 
principle of non-intervention.   
The typical Chinese way of ‘crossing the 
river by feeling for the stones’ seems best 
to characterize the Chinese efforts to find 
tactical ways of dealing with the many new 
expectations, demands and interests facing 
Beijing both domestically and internationally. 
While insisting that China will stay within the 
principle of non-intervention, certain criteria 
for ‘legitimate’ great power intervention are 
being set up – that is, an intervention that 
does not break with the principle of non-in-
tervention. However, the criteria then seem to 
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be continuously adjusted, with some criteria 
being accorded less importance, while new 
ones are added. Hence, it is not so much Chi-
na’s rhetorical support for – and emphasis 
on – the principle of non-intervention that is 
changing, but the Chinese criteria for ‘legiti-
mate’ great-power intervention.   
The main criterion for ‘legitimate’ great-pow-
er intervention stressed by Chinese IR schol-
ars and Chinese diplomats alike is that there 
is a UN resolution in place and thus broad 
international support behind the interven-
tion. This focus on UN authorization relates 
to how Beijing sees the UN as the highest 
international authority, as expressed in 
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech at the 
general debate of the 70th session of the UN 
General Assembly in September 2015 (Xi, 
2015). However, there are indications that a 
UN resolution is becoming less of an ulti-
mate demand and that the focus is shifting 
more to the importance of an invitation or 
request from the country in question. None-
theless it is unclear from whom the invita-
tion is required – all groups in the country? 
This is not likely to happen in the case of 
a political crisis in the country concerned. 
From the leading group, therefore? But then 
China would be taking sides in the country’s 
political crisis. In relation to these questions, 
there are some Chinese IR scholars who 
then emphasize the need for a request and 
for support for Chinese intervention from 
the regional organization involved, such as 
the African Union (cf. also Duchatel, Brauner 
and Zhou, 2014: 5-20). 
Another criterion often highlighted by Chi-
nese IR scholars, the importance of which 
is also reflected in how Chinese foreign and 
security policy is conducted, is the involve-
ment of China’s own national interests, 
whether this is a matter of economic inter-
ests, Chinese citizens, or China’s political and 
security interests (cf. also Wang, 2012). This 
criterion is also often related to the question 
of China’s military capability and ability to 
intervene, where Chinese IR scholars often 
highlight how, despite rapidly increasing 
military spending for many years, China still 
needs many more years to build up its over-
seas military infrastructure and its capacities 
to project its power globally. 
Regarding the focus on the involvement of 
the Chinese military, it seems that Chinese 
IR scholars have recently started empha-
sizing and further specifying the distinction 
between ‘intervention’ and ‘interference’. As 
mentioned above, the principles of non-inter-
vention [bu ganyu] and non-interference [bu 
ganshe] are often used interchangeably by 
Chinese IR scholars and in official Chinese 
documents, but this may be changing. New 
developments here include what looks like a 
narrower definition of intervention, where it is 
only defined as ‘intervention’ if military instru-
ments are used. This further implies that Chi-
nese involvement or interference in another 
state’s economic and political development, 
its playing a mediating role, its seeking to 
participate actively in ‘nation-building’ etc. are 
no longer defined as ‘intervention’. Whether 
this narrower definition develops into an 
official one remains to be seen, but the fact 
that several Chinese IR scholars mentioned 
it in interviews conducted by the author in 
China in October 2015 at least underlines the 
strong urge in China to rethink and reform 
the principle of non-intervention. If the Chi-
nese definition of (great power) intervention 
is changing and becoming narrower, then 
this makes possible a great deal of ‘legiti-
mate’ Chinese involvement and activities in 
other states, as well as generally in the inter-
national system. 
Summing up, what Chinese IR scholars 
tend to stress when presenting their ‘way’ of 
intervention – the ‘legitimate’ way – is that 
the criteria mentioned above are fulfilled 
and that Chinese intervention – or interfer-
ence – always includes and mobilizes all the 
local forces or groups in the particular coun-
try concerned. It is often emphasized how 
domestic groups need to lead the negoti-
ating process and thus how outside forces 
such as China can only play a support role. 
The focus is on what Chinese IR scholars 
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often term ‘the national interest’ [guojia liyi ] 
of the particular country, which implies that 
China always seeks to take in the whole 
picture and the long-term view, as well as to 
avoid taking sides or using military instru-
ments to create or enforce stability (cf. also 
Wang, 2012). 
As China has gradually integrated itself 
into and expanded within the international 
system, its foreign and security policy has 
become subtler and more sophisticated, with 
different dimensions and areas, as well as a 
growing inconsistency between Chinese for-
eign and security policy principles and prac-
tice. Despite the efforts of several Chinese 
IR scholars and diplomats to frame China’s 
growing and more proactive involvement in 
other states’ domestic affairs as something 
other than intervention and interference, 
there is no doubt that current developments 
in Chinese foreign and security policy involve 
making some fundamental choices about 
strategic priorities and old dogmas and 
doctrines; there are limits to how long these 
can be stretched and creatively reinterpreted 
while still retaining their credibility.
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CHINA’S PROACTIVE DIPLOMACY IN 
AFGHANISTAN:  A CHALLENGE TO THE 
PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE
Miwa Hirono
Abstract
Does China’s diplomatic action in conflict-af-
fected regions still fall within the principle of 
non-interference, or does it go beyond the 
principle to interfere in domestic affairs if 
necessary to defend China’s national inter-
ests? In answering this question, China’s 
approach towards Afghanistan offers im-
portant insights into how China’s diplomacy 
has become more proactive and interfering 
today, while it still maintains the principle of 
non-interference legally. However, China’s 
proactive diplomacy has brought with it a 
new challenge in abiding by the principle 
of non-interference, because the extent to 
which China can maintain the principle in 
practice is affected by how it manages its 
relationship with rebel groups. 
A shift in China’s approach to the principle 
of non-interference?
Analysts of China’s foreign policy have 
paid attention to the fact that the country 
has shifted its approach to the principle of 
non-interference since the beginning of the 
2000s. For example, China has agreed to 
all UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 
on peacekeeping authorized under Chapter 
7 of the UN Charter, which authorizes ‘all 
necessary means’ to intervene in countries 
(Hirono 2014). These operations are very 
intrusive in the sense that they effective-
ly allow various actors to intervene in a 
sovereign state, but, of the five permanent 
members of the UNSC, China is now the 
biggest contributor to such UN peacekeep-
ing operations. More recently, the idea of 
China’s changing approach to the principle 
of non-interference has also been applied 
to the analysis of China’s efforts in con-
flict mediation. James Chen (2015), for 
example, states that ‘in 2013 China shifted 
its principle of “non-interference in other 
41China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East – Conference report
countries” to one of active conflict resolu-
tion in some of the world’s most intractable 
contexts: Israel-Palestine, Myanmar, and 
Afghanistan’.
One of the contentious issues in China’s 
approach to the principle of non-interfer-
ence is how it deals with non-state actors. 
In the case of peacekeeping, the host state 
is the sole institutional actor that China 
engages with, whereas in mediation, Chi-
na must deal with rebel groups as well as 
the host state. China’s diplomacy used to 
be based on government-to-government 
relations, but now it has been developed 
further to be able to deal with rebel groups 
in conflict mediation, while still maintaining 
the principle of non-interference as its key 
foreign-policy principle. How do we un-
derstand this contradiction? What does a 
shifting approach to non-interference mean 
in practice in conflict mediation?
This paper focuses on the important case 
of China’s diplomatic action in Afghanistan, 
and assesses the extent to which China has 
retained or modified its approach to the prin-
ciple of non-interference. The paper will first 
unpack the principle and identify some of the 
key elements that define it. By using these el-
ements as a starting point for discussion, the 
paper will then examine the extent to which 
China’s diplomatic action in Afghanistan still 
remains within the principle of non-interfer-
ence.
The paper argues that, despite the com-
mon view that China has shifted its ap-
proach to non-interference, in the case of 
Afghanistan it has actually abided by the 
principle of non-interference legally, as 
defined by the United Nations. However, 
China’s proactive diplomacy has brought 
with it a new challenge in abiding by the 
principle of non-interference, because 
the extent to which China can maintain 
the principle in practice is affected by 
how it manages its relationship with rebel 
groups—an element that China cannot 
necessarily control.
What does non-interference mean?
Despite the fact that non-interference is a 
central term in international relations, very 
few studies provide a clear definition of the 
term. Among the key official documents that 
provide the international legal basis for the 
term are paragraph four of the UN Charter, 
Article 2, and the ‘Declaration on the Inad-
missibility of Intervention and Interference in 
the Internal Affairs of States, A/RES/36/103’ 
(9 December 1981) (hereafter ‘Declaration’) 
(Hess and Aidoo 2010). Paragraph four of 
the UN Charter, Article 2, states ‘all Members 
shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsis-
tent with the Purposes of the United Nations’ 
(United Nations, 1945). The ‘Declaration’ 
points to a number of more specific state 
rights and duties to protect the principle of 
non-interference. Among them, three are the 
more relevant to this paper:
1. ‘The duty of States to refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use 
of force in any form whatsoever to vio-
late the existing internationally recognized 
boundaries of another State, to disrupt the 
political, social or economic order of oth-
er States, [or] to overthrow or change the 
political system of another State or its Gov-
ernment;
2. The duty of a State to refrain from the pro-
motion, encouragement or support, direct 
or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist ac-
tivities within other States, under any pre-
text whatsoever, or any action which seeks 
to disrupt the unity or to undermine or sub-
vert the political order of other States;
3. The duty of a State to abstain from any de-
famatory campaign, vilification or hostile 
propaganda for the purpose of intervening 
or interfering in the internal affairs of other 
States’ (Declaration).
I will use these three ‘State duties’ as the 
starting point of my examination of how 
China is approaching the principle of non-in-
terference in its diplomatic action in Afghan-
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istan and to analyze why China is acting in 
the way it does.
Use of force?
It is clear that China firmly abides by the prin-
ciple of non-interference in relation to the use 
of force in Afghanistan, despite international 
expectations that it provides force and coop-
erates with the International Security Assis-
tance Force (ISAF). First of all, in 2009 the 
US suggested that China opens its Wakhan 
Corridor as NATO’s supply route into Af-
ghanistan, but China ignored the suggestion 
(Bhadrakumar 2013; Szczudlik-Tatar 2014, p. 
2). In 2008, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
invited China to join ISAF, but China refused 
(Spencer 2008). Closer to ISAF’s withdrawal 
in 2014, there were a lot of expectations and 
speculation in both the media and the policy 
and scholarly communities about what China 
could do in post-ISAF Afghanistan (e.g., Ox-
ford Analytica Daily Brief Service 2012; Tiezzi 
2014). Given that China uses its military 
assets for non-UN international operations 
such as disaster relief, anti-piracy operations 
and non-combatant evacuation operations, 
it is not inconceivable that China could use 
force (Hirono and Xu 2013), but it has shown 
no interest in replacing ISAF in the future.
There are two major reasons for this. First, 
China did not want to place its forces under 
the command and control of a foreign force. 
The historical experience of humiliation 
deriving from its semi-colonization led China 
to adopt an ‘independent foreign policy of 
peace’ involving strict independence from 
foreign militaries. China’s independence in 
its military affairs was also one of the key 
issues in relation to the NATO and EU-led 
international anti-piracy operations in the 
Gulf of Aden, which China refused to join, 
instead maintaining its own transit corridor 
only five nautical miles away from the NATO 
and EU-led international corridor (Hirono and 
Xu 2013). Further, in the case of Afghanistan, 
China was critical of the unilateral approach 
NATO has been accused of taking. In the 
words of Wang Yizhou, ISAF was committing 
itself to a ‘new interventionism,’ which ‘bor-
rowed the cloak of legitimate intervention, 
but it is actually exceeding its authority and 
working for its own interests’ (Renmin Ribao 
2011). Secondly, even since the end of ISAF 
operations in 2014, China has still not been 
interested in using armed intervention in Af-
ghanistan because of the inefficacy demon-
strated by ISAF over the previous thirteen 
years. Ren Xiao of Fudan University even 
stated that ‘the withdrawal of ISAF and US 
forces from Afghanistan may eliminate one 
of the drivers of conflict in the country’ (Ren, 
cited in van der Kley 2014, pp. 5-6).
China’s relations with the Taliban
With regard to the second duty of a state to 
‘refrain from the promotion, encouragement 
or support, direct or indirect, of rebellious or 
secessionist activities’, the key question of in-
terest to this paper is whether, and if so how, 
China has promoted, encouraged or support-
ed the Taliban’s activities.
What follows is a brief history of the relation-
ship between China and the Taliban. Since 
the late 1990s, when the Taliban formed the 
Afghan government, China sought its assur-
ances that it would not let Uyghur militants 
launch attacks against China from Afghan 
territory (Small 2015a, p. 129). In December 
2000, Lu Shulin, China’s ambassador to Paki-
stan, became one of very few foreigners who 
managed to meet Mullah Mohammad Omar, 
the then Afghan head of state, who agreed to 
China’s request not to support Uygur mili-
tants (Small 2015a, p. 129; Bangash 2001). In 
return, ‘Omar sought two things from China: 
formal political recognition and protection 
from U.N. sanctions’ (Small 2013). Howev-
er, China ended up not giving the Taliban 
diplomatic recognition. When it came to 
sanctions, China’s response was ambivalent. 
At the UNSC, China used the usual tactic of 
abstention from voting on Resolution 1333 
relating to sanctions against the Taliban, but 
did not use its veto (Small 2013; UN 2000), 
meaning essentially that it tacitly approved 
them. At the same time, China also ‘estab-
lished trade links that would help mitigate the 
impact of the sanctions’ (Small 2013).
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During the war from 2001 to 2014, China 
maintained a low profile (Zhao 2013, pp. 
5-9; Pantucci 2010), but then became ‘an 
active and enthusiastic supporter of recon-
ciliation between the Taliban and the Afghan 
government’ (Small 2015b). This is due to 
the view among the Chinese policymakers 
that reconciliation is the only way to prevent 
Afghanistan from ‘becoming a safe haven 
for Uighur militants and a destabilizing force 
across the wider region’ (Small 2015b). China 
hosted the ‘Heart of Asia’ or ‘Istanbul Pro-
cess’ meeting in Beijing in October-November 
2014, which aimed to promote ‘Afghan-led 
and Afghan-owned’ reconciliation.1 To that 
end, China invited the Afghan government 
and the Taliban to the meeting. Although 
the Taliban did not show up, China hosted 
a delegation of Afghan Taliban officials in 
Beijing in December 2014 (Hodge, Totakhil 
and Chin 2015), and reportedly again in May 
2015 (Stancati 2015).2 It is not clear what 
was achieved in those meetings, but a report 
suggests they ‘aimed at discussing precondi-
tions for a possible peace process’ (Stancati 
2015).
There are two observations to make here. 
First, if we take the wording of the ‘Declara-
tion’ (i.e., ‘refrain from the promotion, en-
couragement or support, direct or indirect, of 
rebellious or secessionist activities’) literally, 
China’s aforementioned support to the Tal-
iban would appear to be an infringement of 
its duty. However, the spirit of the Declaration 
relates to the second half of the sentence: 
‘any action which seeks to disrupt the unity 
or to undermine or subvert the political order 
of other States’. China’s aim in maintaining 
contact with the Taliban is, rather, to stamp 
out overseas bases for Uyghur ‘terrorists’ and 
to ensure the success of the Afghan peace 
process. Therefore, to say that China has 
‘violated’ the principle of non-interference is 
quite out of context. One can conclude that 
China has actually abided by the principle of 
non-interference legally in its dealings with 
the Taliban.
Second, China’s relations with the Taliban 
deserve attention, as they go beyond its 
traditional ‘government-to-government’ 
approach. When China’s national interests 
are at stake, it is prepared to make contact 
with rebel groups. China’s current intention 
to maintain contact with the Taliban in the 
context of the peace talks also derives from 
its national interests: preventing terrorism 
and safeguarding its security and economic 
interests in Afghanistan. China’s economic 
interests in Afghanistan – particularly copper 
fields in Mes Aynak – are in the hands of the 
Taliban. Further, the One Belt One Road and 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will go 
through Taliban-controlled areas in the north-
ern part of Pakistan. China cannot afford to 
endanger an important part of its more than 
$500 billion investment.
‘Hostility’?
The third duty brings out the question of 
whether China is responsible for ‘any defam-
atory campaign, vilification or hostile propa-
ganda’. Defamation, vilification and hostility 
are subjective terms. To what extent does the 
Taliban think that China is mounting ‘hostile 
propaganda’ against it? As mentioned earlier, 
China has maintained a low profile in Afghan-
istan for a long time. Thus, ‘China’s role in Af-
ghanistan is seen as neutral as the Taliban 
[has] never fostered any hostility with their 
northeastern neighbour, which does not 
have any military or strategic ambitions for 
the country’ (Khan 2014).
However, a couple of examples show that 
some factions of the Taliban seem to per-
ceive China as being hostile to it, because 
1 The ‘Istanbul Process’ meeting delivered ‘Beijing Dec-
laration’, in which participants ‘call[ed] on all parties to 
encourage the Taliban towards reconciliation’ (Heart of 
Asia, 2014).
2 Mullah Abdul Jalil, Mullah Mohammad Hassan Rahmani 
and Mullah Abdul Raqaq, all of whom are based in Paki-
stan, were said to have participated in the talks, but the 
Taliban claims that the talks did not take place and that 
only those members in its Qatar-based political com-
mission are entitled to participate in peace-related talks. 
However, the Taliban often denies publicly the existence 
of peace efforts, while confirming them privately. See 
Stancati (2015) for details.
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of China’s policy towards its Muslim pop-
ulations, as well as its close relations with 
Pakistan and the current Afghan govern-
ment. The Taliban has attacked China’s Mes 
Aynak copper mine nineteen times (Brazier 
2012; cited in Downs 2012, p. 78), and dozens 
of Chinese engineers and workers have been 
kidnapped (Huanqiu 2010).3 Some analysts 
claim that ‘militants blamed China for the Pa-
kistani government’s 2007 decision to launch 
an assault on the Red Mosque, a pro-Taliban 
stronghold in Islamabad, and duly retaliated 
with a series of attacks on Chinese workers 
in Pakistan’ (Small 2013; see also French 
2007; Pantucci 2010, p. 23; Parello-Plesner 
and Duchâtel 2014, p. 80). Added to this, 
China’s relations with the Taliban are now 
experiencing significant challenges, mainly 
deriving from the death of its leader Mullah 
Mohammad Omar – so-called ‘China’s Man’ 
– in 2013. After his death the Taliban became 
more fragmented, so even though China at-
tempts to maintain contact with the Taliban 
to try and bring it to the peace talks, there are 
numerous factions within the group that are 
separate from those who participate in the 
talks (Small 2015b).
The principle of non-interference is indeed 
tricky. Even though one may intend to abide 
by the principle, ideas such as ‘hostility’, 
which are a part of the definition of the 
principle, are subjective, so there emerges a 
perception gap between China and the rebel 
groups about the nature of China’s activity 
in Afghanistan. China’s proactive diplomacy 
has brought about a new challenge to the 
aim of abiding by the principle of non-interfer-
ence, as the extent to which it is perceived to 
be doing so depends on how well it and the 
rebel groups can manage their relationship. 
But of course, when even the identification 
of factions in the rebel groups is difficult, 
managing a relationship with them could be 
a ‘mission impossible’.
Concluding remarks
This paper has demonstrated that, despite 
the common view that China is shifting its 
approach to the principle of non-interference, 
it actually abides by the principle legally. It 
has also observed, however, that China has 
gone beyond its traditional approach to diplo-
macy based on government-to-government 
relations, and has maintained its relationship 
with the Taliban in order to safeguard its 
national interests. The paper has also dis-
cussed the subjective nature of the principle 
of non-interference in the context of whether 
a state mounts ‘hostile’ propaganda.
Even though China actively supports recon-
ciliation talks between the Taliban and the 
Afghan government, how successfully it can 
maintain relations with the Taliban depends 
on the Taliban’s own situation and how China 
can manage the gap in perceptions between 
its intentions and what the Taliban considers 
it is doing to the group, as well as to Islam as 
a whole. The international community should 
have certain expectations with regard to Chi-
na’s role, but they need to be realistic, as Chi-
na is grappling with a very complex problem 
– on that ISAF was unable to resolve during 
its thirteen years in Afghanistan.
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